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ABSTRACT
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Title:

Reorganizing the Oregon Department of Human Services: An
Exploratory Case Study of Organizational Change.

For decades, states have tried to reorganize their human service
agencies in order to more effectively coordinate and integrate client
services. Despite appearing to be a reasonable undertaking, previous
studies indicated that such efforts met with only limited success (Dunkle &
Surles, 1998; Pindus et al. 2000; Rabin & Steinhauer, 1988; GAO, 1992;
Lynn, 1980; Owens, 1985).
This study had three objectives tied to understanding this type of
reorganization. First, find out whether the OD process could inform
restructuring. Second, determine whether evidence of the constraints to
implementing planned organizational change that have been identified in the
literature, became manifest during this reorganization. In addition, if there
were indications of constraints, to see if potential solutions for overcoming
them could be generated through the participatory action researchorganization development (PAR-OD) process. Third, see if the type of

policy and the source of funds were related to the support for and
magnitude of reorganization.
This study drew upon two sources to develop a list of potential
constraints to change and then compared the results of the data
generated during this reorganization to those constraints. Administrative
changes during the course of the restructuring provided valuable insight
into the nature of the challenges of reorganizing state public human
services.
Because the reorganization was suspended during the course of
the study, results were inconclusive regarding the first objective.
Nonetheless, the data generated during the early stages of the
reorganization, were used to inform choices about the direction of the
reorganization made during and after an administrative transition.
Constraints to change could be identified as well as potential solutions.
Furthermore, those constraints to change that were identified, as well as
the suspension itself, point to a different direction in understanding how to
reorganize public human services. There was no indication that the
proportion of the budget that came from state vs. other funds impacted the
magnitude of change. However, there were indications that the health
services area of the department was not as involved in the reorganization
as other areas, with the unanticipated exception of the ‘finance and policy’.
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INTRODUCTION

The main objective of this study was to determine if one kind of
planned organizational change, organization development, might inform
another, the formal restructuring of a public human service organization.
The setting was the State of Oregon Department of Human Services
(Oregon DHS). The agency was reorganizing in order to further integrate
client services.
For decades, states have tried to reorganize their human service
agencies in order to more effectively coordinate and integrate client
services. While this would seem to be a reasonable undertaking, previous
studies indicated that such efforts met with only limited success (Dunkle &
Surles, 1998; Pindus et al. 2000; Rabin & Steinhauer, 1988; GAO, 1992;
Lynn, 1980; Owens, 1985).
States have long recognized that the needs of clients who use public
human service organizations are complex, and while the program, policy,
and funding streams are also complex, it is up to the public human service
organization to reduce, if not eliminate, that complexity (Polend, 2002). In
assessing efforts to reorganize in order to achieve this end, federal
analysts concluded that there were three types of barriers to successful
change-programmatic, logistical, and managerial (Pindus et al., 2000).
The programmatic barriers to integration included different parts of an
1

agency having differing program goals, concepts of coordination,
performance standards, and changes in caseloads. The logistical barriers
included geographic issues, lease contract terms, and office space
limitations. They also included incompatible client forms, union rules, and
civil service regulations. The managerial barriers included ‘turf battles,
complex reporting relationships, constituency or stakeholder obligations,
and time constraints (Pindus et al., 2000). The facilitating forces found to
promote coordination were a strong economy, technological advances,
greater financial resources, and state initiatives. Their study included
factors identified in an earlier 1992 GAO report (GAO, 1992, Pindus et al.
2000).
Another explanation for the limited success of such reorganization
efforts is that a ‘hierarchical organization’ is simply incompatible with one
that must address complex human needs (Polend, 2002). All of the
preceding perspectives served to reinforce the idea that altering
organizational structure would overcome these barriers.
Earlier, however, Owens’ (1985) multi-case study of state human
service reorganizations concluded that reorganization had limited effects
on overcoming entrenched interest and effecting changes in processes.

Earlier still, Lynn (1980) concluded that the precipitating events for
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changing public human service organizations, as well as for their
termination, were largely political and economic. “Political” was defined as
being motivated by efforts to consolidate power within either the legislative
or the executive branches of government, and triggered or suspended
largely by the results of partisan electoral politics, whereas “economic”
referred to elected officials demonstrating responsiveness to public
demand to reduce expenditure. In some cases, an incoming Governor
explicitly campaigned on undoing the efforts of his or her predecessor.
Lynn (1980) noted that once the impetus for change subsided, the
organization either passively or intentionally reverted to its previous
structure.
If one accepts, prima facie, the logical direction of these previous
assessments, then building on that work presents a considerable
challenge, because one would be led to the conclusion that attempting to
reorganize a public human service organization would be, largely, futile.
However, there are alternative approaches worth exploring that may
provide insights into the change process in this setting, which could then
be used to address the constraints to change and thus improve the
planning of future organizational change efforts. This study adds to
existing knowledge by delving further into the question why this type of
change effort has been challenging and by exploring a means for
3

addressing those challenges by applying organizational development
methodology during a restructuring.
It was with the knowledge of past reorganization efforts that the
Oregon DHS undertook its restructuring. The primary motivation for
change was to better address the needs of the clients (DHS, 1999). The
intention was to simplify, for clients, the process of obtaining services.
Elimination of duplication and increasing administrative efficiency were
also expected outcomes. Cost savings were an additional goal of the
restructuring, and the resulting revenue was to be reallocated back into
the agency.
This study appears to be unique. It was based on a set of
circumstances that allowed the study of organization development (OD)
being applied during the course of restructuring a public human service
agency, and observation of the effects. Previously, the two types of
organizational change, OD and formal restructuring, have occurred in
isolation. Additionally, previous studies of the restructuring of human
services organizations were retrospective. This study focused on whether
OD could be used to inform and help guide a restructuring effort while it
was in progress.

This study had three objectives. The first objective was to find out
whether the OD process could inform restructuring. The second objective
was to determine whether evidence of the constraints to implementing
planned organizational change that have been identified in the literature
became manifest during this reorganization. In addition, if there were
indications of constraints, to see if potential solutions for overcoming them
could be generated through the participatory action research-organization
development (PAR-OD) process. The third objective was to see if the types
of policy (defined later) and the source of funds for different parts of the
agency were related to the support for and magnitude of reorganization.
As noted, this study adds to the existing body of knowledge on
organizational change in a public human service organization by
examining the process while it was occurring, and, based on the
information generated, whether a course correction could be made, if
needed, through the application of the OD process. It also served to
reassess some conclusions in the literature on the reasons for the limited
success of reorganizing in order to further integrate services by providing
an explicit contrast with the existing literature and the study results.
Unique themes emerged from the interviews conducted during this study.

Tables are presented that compare a general organizational dynamics
model with constraint themes identified in previous studies.
5

One of the more prominent studies on restructuring human service
organizations (Lynn, 1980) is similar to the OD literature of its time, by
being largely a subjective retrospective evaluation by the person who
facilitated the reorganization. The study presented here builds upon
previous work by adding the author’s view as a participant - observer. In
addition, it prospectively tests the question of whether the application of
OD principles can enhance formal restructuring and by identifying
constraints to change. The conclusions in this study are based on several
sources assessing the conclusion of previous evaluations.
Unlike previous examinations, this study did not rely exclusively on a
retrospective case study. It employed two distinct data sources, including
the results from the OD process and archival data that included legislation
enabling the reorganization, and the organization’s plans and progress
reports. Thus, results could be confirmed by more than one source, and
answers to questions that were raised in any one of the data sources
could be provided by the other data sources.
The two methods of planned organizational change employed here
reflect distinct schools of organizational theory (Lincoln, Burrell, and
Morgan). These two types of planned organizational change are rooted in

contrasting schools of thought about organizations, whether public or
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private. Briefly, and very generally, the focus of the human relations
school is based on creating an empowering, supportive working
environment for employees, whereas the focus of the classic school is on
power, authority, and control. OD exemplifies the human relations school
o f organization theory, while restructuring exemplifies the classic school of
organization theory. On the surface, at least, these two theories would
appear to be incompatible.
Yet, the results here indicate that not only can they complement one
another, but also when combined, they may enhance the effectiveness of
reorganization. Moreover, information was provided in both directions;
that is, the OD process informed the formal restructuring, and using the
OD process during formal restructuring helped identify areas that might
improve the OD process itself.
Following this introduction, this dissertation presents a literature
review, the research methods used, the research results, and conclusions.
The literature review provides a framework for this study by first describing
the broad topic of organization theory and planned organizational change,
then narrowing to organizational change in public organizations, and
further narrowing to the subject of planned organizational change in a

public human service organization. In addition, a description of types of
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policies and their implementation in public human service organizations is
also presented. Following the literature review is a description of the
research methods used for this study, a summary of the resulting data, an
analysis of the data and discussion of the implications of the study, its
limitations, and conclusions.

LITERATURE REVIEW
This review begins with the broad topic of organization theory, narrows
to a description of studies on planned organizational change in public
organizations, then moves to a high-level discussion of public policy and
the day-to-day work of the public human service employee. It ends with a
review of research on attempts at service integration in public human
service organizations.

Organization Theory
Appropriately, Gortner et al. (1989) began their discussion of
organization theory by asking, “what is an organization?” (p. 5). They
asserted that there are a variety of definitions of organizations, each
having implications for theoreticians and analysts. In other words, the
definition of an organization draws the boundaries for studies and resulting
analyses. Their question was meant to be practical, not esoteric or
intended merely for intellectual interest. For example, does one consider,
as part of an organization, the executive and legislative branches of local
governments, the federal government, the private (outside) contractors
who perform key processes, client advocate groups, or em ployee
bargaining units? Would a state employee whose wages are 75%
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federally or grant funded, who determines his or her own day-to-day work
activities and stipulates the means of accounting for his or her time, or a
subcontracted non-profit entity, be considered part of the organization?
For the purposes of the study presented here, a public organization is
defined as a legislatively created and funded entity that is part of the
administrative structure of the government. Most state public human
service organizations are under the authority of the Governor.
Shafritz and Ott (1992) suggest that there is not one organization
theory but several (pp. 4-5), and that they are underdeveloped. This
sentiment is echoed by Gortner et al. (1989, p. 5). Additionally, while
research on organizations and organizational change is voluminous, the
state of knowledge has been more of a debate than what could be
characterized as established principles. Each school of thought has
different origins in academic discipline, time, and level of analysis (Gortner
et al., 1989, pp. 7-10). Because of this, there is little consensus about
what to study or how. This means that significant advances in
organization theory are infrequent because there is little agreement about
the existence of a formulated group of principles.
Shafritz and Ott (1992) found enough distinctions to cluster
organization theories into schools. They called the schools: classic-
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neoclassical; the organizational behavior perspective or human relations
theory; modern structural organization theory; systems, contingency,
population-ecology organization theory; multiple constituencies/market
organization theory; power politics organization theory; and organizational
culture and symbolic management organization theory (Shafritz & Ott,
1992). The two schools of organization theory of interest here are the
classic school and the human relations school.
The classic school o f organization theory holds that effective
organizations ought to emphasize a formal structure, which is based on
the premise that individuals are motivated by a ‘rational choice,’ in an
economic sense. That is to say, the classic school of organizational
theory assumes that people will act to maximize their individual selfinterest, even if acting in one’s self-interest may run contrary to the long
term survival of the organization. As Anthony Downs put it,
The fundamental premise of the theory is that bureaucratic officials,
like all other agents and society are significantly—though not solely—
motivated by their own self-interests (Downs, 1967, p. 2).
Consequently, the classic school of organizational theory contends that
organizations should be structured in such a way as to control this innate
human tendency to maximize self-interest, in order to protect the interests
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of the organization. The classic school of organizational theory places
emphasis on elements of an organization such as the formal
organizational structure, span of control, and socio-technical interface. In
short, the focus is on how one person can control the behavior of another.
Those in authority (i.e. supervisors and managers), impose rules and
standards, rather than involving staff in the decisions that determine how
their duties are performed. The basis for the classic school of
organizational theory is industrial engineering concepts and the purpose is
to maximize individual productivity (Shafritz & Ott, p 27). Efforts that focus
on reorganization and restructuring as the primary approach to bring about
change exemplify the classic school of organization theory. Fredrick
Taylor (1916) and Max Weber (1946) have also presented this
perspective.
The human relations school of organization theory, sometimes called
the organizational behavior perspective of organizational theory, is based
on applied psychology and critical social science. The human relations
school of organization theory asserts that an organization should place at
least equal emphasis on the needs of the individual employee as on those
of the organization. Consider Richard Beckhard’s description of what he

saw as the most important management challenge:
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the dilemma of how to (a) fully mobilize the energy of the
organization’s human resources towards achievement of the
organization’s performance objectives, and (b) at the same time, so
organize the work, the work environment, the communication systems,
and the relationships of people, that individuals’ needs for self-worth,
growth, and satisfaction are significantly met at work (p. v).
According to this theory, managers ought to prioritize individual
development, interpersonal communication, and equal distribution of
power, thus recruiting the creativity, knowledge, and experience of all
employees, as well as their sense of accomplishment on the job. As
noted before, organization development has its roots in the human
relations school of organization theory. Examples of this perspective are
found in the writings of Chris Argyris, Abraham Maslow, and Douglas
McGregor.
The descriptions of both theories contain the word ‘should.’ That is
because both schools of thought have embedded values and are
prescriptive; that is, they describe what ‘ought’ to be. These values
become part of the change process by guiding the actions of those
responsible for the changes and may influence how people within the
organization will react to the change effort (Katz and Kahn, 1966, pp. 300
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- 335; Quinn, 1980). Both schools describe a desirable end-state and
suggest, either explicitly or implicitly, that managers, owners, or
administrators ought to change their organizations based on the
assumptions of the principles of each school.
The human relations school assumes that a good source of knowledge
about how to address organizational issues is the ‘street level’ worker. In
other words, this would be considered a ‘ground up’ approach. By
contrast, the classic school carries with it the idea that there are experts
on organizations and that expertise is the core basis for designing change;
i.e., if the form or structure is changed, the desired behavior will follow,
directed by upper management. In this case, the change is imposed from
the ‘top down’ (Shafritz & Ott, p. 144). In summary, in the classic school
one would change the organizational structure and reporting relationships
and the desired change in personnel behavior would follow, contrasted
with the human relations school, which suggests that giving authority to
the front line people will result in a more effective organization, and that
organizational support will follow.
It has been suggested that the classical school and the human
relations school of organization theory are antithetical (Burrell & Morgan;

Lincoln, p. 78), or at least dissimilar enough to warrant being considered
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distinct schools of thought (Shafritz & Ott, p. 7). In other words, it has
been argued that the schools are dichotomous (Argyris, 1973).
Human relations theorists assert that there is a relationship between
organizational change, stress, job satisfaction, and productivity
(Neugeboren). While they suggest there is a positive relationship between
improved work conditions and organizational effectiveness, the correlation
between these concepts is unproven. Currently, there is no conclusive
evidence of a positive correlation between job satisfaction and
organizational performance (Landy, Lawler, Neugeboren, Ostroff, and
Sanford). Similarly, some studies indicate that less democratic
organizations are not necessarily less effective and that the employees in
these types of organizations are not necessarily less satisfied than their
counterparts in more egalitarian organizations (Landy).
There is no shortage of studies on organizations (just a cursory websearch for ‘a study of organizations’ yielded 7,745,000 ‘hits’). The
challenge for researchers who study organizations is that neither school of
organization theory is wholly represented in reality in such a way that
would allow direct testing. Furthermore, the actions born in each school
are based on contrasting values and reflect different orientations. That is,
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the values of the schools of thought seem to be embodied in the
organization’s leadership (Bennis and Nanus, 1985).
Relying heavily on Marcia W ilkofs dissertation, Organizational Culture
(1982), Bennis and Nanus (1985, p. 119), described three styles of social
architecture. These were the formalistic, collegial, and personalistic styles
of leadership (pp. 110-152). The formalistic and collegial styles reflect the
classic and human relations schools, respectively, much as restructuring
and OD reflect these two schools of thought. The ‘formalistic’ style values
direction from authority as a basis for decision-making; the forms of
control are from rules, laws, rewards and punishment, and compliance is
the desired end state. One’s position relative to others is hierarchical,
one’s power is based on being in a superior hierarchical position, human
relationships are structured, and deviation form authoritative direction and
risk taking are to be avoided. By contrast, the ‘collegial’ style uses
discussion and agreement as a basis for decision making; interpersonal
and group commitment are the basis for control, consensus is a desired
end, failing to reach consensus is to be avoided, peer relationships exist
with others, power is derived from the group’s view, and relationships are
group oriented (p. 138). Other authors have made analogous contrasts
(Lincoln, Burrell, and Morgan).

16

Carnevale (2003) asserts that “organizational development is a value
laden technology used to change organizations” (p. 37), a view consistent
with that of authors who describe how to undertake organizational change
through OD, such as French and Bell (1990 pp. 44-51) and Burke (pp. 88
- 102).

French and Bell (1990), for example, point out that “value is placed on
welfare (sic) of all system members...” (p. 48). They add that:
OD programs are aimed at improving the welfare and quality of work
life for all contributing members of the organization. They are neither a
method for giving tools of manipulation or exploitation to any group
(say, the managerial group), nor are they a method for improving the
welfare of one group at the expense of other groups (p. 48).

Action Research and Organization Development
Organization development is an example of the application of the
human relations school of organization theory. OD also has roots in a
method of social inquiry called action research. Action research is applied
research in which participants take part in generating, validating, applying,
and evaluating the outcome of the work. Both OD and action research
require subjectively generated information. While there is considerable
overlap between OD and action research, they are not synonymous. OD
17

has intervention branches that have little relevance to action research; for
example, it also encompasses individual-level career counseling. Action
research is a theory of social science and is related to field theory, a
behavioral science field.
Development of action research has been attributed to Kurt Lewin
(Peters & Robinson, 1984). It is an attempt to apply social theory in a
practical sense. One of Lewin’s key contributions was to advocate
informing social science theory through fieldwork. He viewed action
research as applicable to global, social, community, and work place
settings (Lewin, 1947a).
Lewin asserted that to effect change, individuals’ perceptions need to
be taken into account. Then, as the perceptions are discussed, they can
be corrected, revised, or modified, as indicated or agreed upon. Lewin
called this descriptive process (participants describing their perspective)
‘field theory.’ Field theory is applied through graphically mapping
perceptions of contentious issues, along with the anticipated effects of
presenting such perspectives. As the maps are discussed, changes in
perceptions often result. Lewin (1947a) referred to the change of
perceptions as “unfreezing.”

18

Unfreezing takes place when presumptions are checked against the
“actual outcome and the motivation for each” (p. 36). The group, which
could be a family, business, or nation-state, affects the perceptions of the
individual and the individual affects the perceptions of the group. Lewin
(1947a) suggested that stages consisting of unfreezing, change, and then
refreezing take place. This cycle can be repeated until resolution is
reached.
The object and level of analysis of change is the group, although
individuals’ perceptions are the fulcrum. Lewin suggested that group
concerns should be dealt with most appropriately at the group level. The
unfreezing, change, then refreezing phases correspond to the diagnosis,
intervention, and evaluation phases of OD presented in more detail later.
The OD consultant/investigator analyzes data generated by the
organization around a problem, and presents the findings to the
organization, along with suggestions for solving that problem.
Action science is similar to action research and was developed by
Chris Argyris as an approach to OD (Argyris, 1971, 1982, 1993; Argyris,
et. al., 1985; Argyris & Schon, 1974; Cunningham, 1993). Argyris uses
data from observations and interviews to create an environment that

facilitates “double-loop learning” (Argyris, Putnam, & Smith, 1985). The
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“double-loop learning” process is a feedback system that seeks and uses
data to show how well the espoused values of an organization and its
managers are perceived to align with actual practice. It creates a
recursive system of evaluation, in that not only are data gathered and
evaluated, but also adds a second iteration that examines how that
information is received. If well received, it may result in positive change.
Defensiveness in accepting the results, on the part of anyone within the
client organization, is included as data itself, is part of the evaluation, and
is brought to the attention of participants. This development and feedback
of data are a continuous process.
A hypothetical example may help illustrate this concept. Imagine a
manager who perceives himself or herself as always being open to new
ideas. However, a theme emerges from employee interviews (one of the
OD data gathering methods) indicating that employees have not been
bringing new ideas or suggestions to the manager because he or she
always seemed too busy. Consequently, the employees felt they had to
focus on the most critical pressing issues in any communication with the
manager and not discuss longer-range ideas. As a result, both the
manager and those with innovative ideas maintain their possibly
erroneous perceptions, and nothing new is introduced or changed.

20

In this hypothetical example, creating an environment in which
participants could discuss these issues would allow the manager and the
employees to contrast their self-limiting assumptions— i.e., the manager’s
perception of him or herself as always being open to new ideas could be
contrasted with the employees’ perception that they had to focus on the
most critical pressing issues in any communication with the manager. In a
feedback session of the interview information, misperceptions could be
corrected, and positive, productive change implemented. Going through
this process is thought to help an organization develop. That is, being
able to experience the systematic collection of data, graphically
representing it, and then transforming it into action, in a constructive
atmosphere, without defensiveness, helps a group adapt to its
environment (Argyris et al., 1985).
Argyris (1985) focused on the interaction between the individual and
the organization, rather than the design of organizational systems. He
suggested, much like McGregor, that emphasis on formal organizational
structures and traditional management practices might be inconsistent
with a natural human striving for growth and development (Shafritz and
Ott). The creation of a “learning organization” may resolve these apparent
inconsistencies.

21

Argyris describes learning organizations as either single-loop (which
maintains an organization in its current form) or double-loop (which
redefines the organization). A learning organization is one that
intentionally generates information that evaluates its goals and objectives,
examines how well it meets its objectives, reviews its methods of
measurement, incorporates multiple sources of evaluation, searches for
barriers to becoming a learning organization, and attempts to overcome
them.
Phases of Organization Development
The model of OD used here comes from Burke (1982) who identified
seven phases of the OD process: 1) Entry, 2) Contracting, 3) Diagnosis, 4)
Feedback, 5) Planning Change, 6) Intervention, and 7) Evaluation (p.
159). The entry phase is that in which the individual OD consultant is
contacted by the organization. In this phase, the OD practitioner assesses
the level of cooperation on the part of the primary contact person for the
organization, as well as the potential for a successful project. In the
contracting phase, the actions to be taken by the OD practitioner, as well
as by the organization, are explicitly described. The diagnosis and
feedback phases are described in more detail later. Phase five lays out
what actions are to be taken and when, in response to phase three. In the
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intervention phase, there is implementation of the action steps. The
evaluation phase is an assessment of the effectiveness of the intervention
(Burke, 1982, p. 159-164).

Entry
The major task of the OD consultant during the entry phase is to
determine the general nature of the contact initiated by a client
organization, and the appropriateness of the OD consultant’s involvement.
At this point, the OD consultant seeks answers to questions such as: Is
this a labor grievance issue? Is this problem a compensation/human
resource issue? Are the perceived problems related to an individual
employees’ drug or alcohol abuse? Is it a group problem or an individual
problem? Are there legal issues, contracts, or grievance procedures
involved? Is the scope of the problem relatively unique to this group or is
it a system-wide or industry-wide problem? If the group is willing to
undergo the OD process, does it lack the authority to implement the
changes needed? The answers to these questions may indicate the need
to refer the group to an appropriate contact that is better suited to address
these types of issues—employee assistance programs, lawyers, or human
resource personnel, for example (Burke, 1982, pp. 158-163). O D is used
in such cases only for preliminary diagnosis and appropriate referral.
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Contracting
The contracting phase begins when the consultant sets up a meeting
with those who have the authority to make changes. During this meeting,
the clients are asked to describe their previous experience with the
relevant issue(s) or problems as they see them, prior attempts to resolve
them, and their objectives and expectations for the OD process (Burke,
1982; see also Weisbord, 1973). The OD consultant states his or her
requirements: (a) He or she must be allowed to develop an independent
picture of those in the work group, in order to gain honest perceptions of
how things operate now, how participants would like them to operate, and
suggestions for how to get to that point; (b) The client must be willing to
allocate resources necessary to address or correct the problems
identified; (c) The consultant must have a forum for providing feedback to
the person(s) in charge concerning how they may be contributing to
problems identified by the evaluation; and finally (d) The client must be
willing to provide feedback on the consultant’s effectiveness. The OD
consultant decides at this point whether to take on the project and the
client decides whether to agree to a contract (Burke, 1982, pp. 158-163).
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Diagnosis
The diagnostic phase consists of data gathering. It is an assessment
of the challenges and strengths of the organization, the ‘independent
picture’ referred to above. Burke (1982) states that data gathering has
three goals, develop valid information, create and direct energy, and build
relationships. Burke also holds that “the interview may be the most useful
technique (compared to questionnaires and observations) for data
collection because it comes the closest to accomplishing all three goals”
(p. 203).
Feedback
This step is the rough equivalent of unfreezing in field theory (Lewin,
1947a). The purposes of a feedback session are (a) to help the client
understand the data, (b) to transfer ownership of the data back to the
client, and (c)to begin action planning (Burke, 1982, p. 209). This
involves validating the assessment, beginning open discussions, and
continuing data gathering (Burke, 1982; see also Cunningham, 1976).
Burke (1982) points to four feelings that may be produced by the sessions:
anxiety, defensiveness, fear, and hope. The feedback session is used to
convert these feelings into areas of agreement and plans for action. This
is accomplished by creating a setting in which it is safe to openly discuss
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problems and methods for addressing them. The consultant must walk a
fine line between letting the group struggle to learn by itself through
discourse and maintaining momentum (Burke, 1982; see also Block,
1981).

Intervention
Burke (1982) advocates basing intervention choices on action
research. He relies on the work of Argyris (1970) for determining the
criteria for an effective intervention; its planning and type; and whether it is
predetermined, modified to the group, or newly created (pp. 215-221).
Burke does not emphasize or suggest one particular type, depth, or
duration of intervention. He does suggest, echoing Argyris (1970), that
the intervention be targeted toward the level and issues around which
there is the most energy or concern. This means that the intervention(s)
should be based on the issues most frequently identified, and for which
there is the greatest willingness and ability to effect change.
The consultant makes recommendations about which intervention(s) to
undertake. He or she does so after the interview summary is completed
and other observations are considered. The consultant should be
prepared to make the recommendations to the primary client during a
meeting before the formal feedback session of the larger group, though
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the consultant may suggest options for change only after the group has
made and considered its choices. He or she explains the activity, time
commitment, and goals of each intervention option.

Evaluation
The evaluation phase is used to test the original hypothesis (that the
plan will work), and, using diagnostic information, to make modifications to
the plan, and to provide the decision-making information to move to the
next iteration of the cycle or to end the process. Burke (1982) suggested
four general guidelines for conducting an evaluation. First, he
reemphasizes the importance of collaboration in every phase of the OD
process. Second, he recommends establishing a clear but flexible
evaluation research strategy. Third, he suggests tying the strategy to the
diagnosis. Fourth, he proposes providing adequate methods for collecting
and analyzing the data. The methods should provide valid information, be
tied to a theory or model, and be useful to the client in the final analysis (p.
332).
From the viewpoint of an OD consultant who is charged with facilitating
organizational change, a desired outcome would be that the organization
demonstrates that it has acquired the ability to diagnose problems, plan
and implement solutions, and evaluate improvements on its own, without
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depending on an outside “expert” in social science. The most effective
organization should be self-directed and self-empowered, and measures
of success should be group created, defined, applied, and reviewed
(Block, 1981).
This process requires collaboration, an element that is woven
throughout the OD process. Frohman, Sashkin, and Kavanagh (1982)
write that the basic OD model,
is based on collaboration between the behavioral scientist-researcher
and the client. They collaborate in exploring problems and generating
valid data concerning the problems (research activity); in examining
the information to understand the problems and developing action
plans for their solution; in implementing these plans and in generating
data regarding the effects of the action. By means of repetition of this
cycle, real problems are resolved and the client learns to use a
research-based model of problem solving (p. 128).
Collaboration means that entire process results from the efforts of all
participants, members of the client organization and behavioral scientistresearcher (OD consultant). The problems or issues are articulated by the
client, summarized into themes by the OD consultant, and the accuracy of
the summary is confirmed by the client (Burke, 1982).
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Collaboration is especially important in OD because it maximizes the
opportunity for self-discovery, learning, and change (Burke, 1982). It is
important that the client have confidence in the validity of the data
generated and that they conceptually ‘own’ it throughout the process.
Without the collaborative element, it may be easier for members of the
work group to discount the data because it would constitute the product of
an outsider unfamiliar with the nuances of the particular organization and
the people involved. If the work group discounts the data, it is less likely
that it will take the recommended action steps. Contrast this with the
creation of the group’s perception that there is agreement on the nature of
the issues they face, and the importance of collaboration becomes clear.
The participants would then be aware of the reasons for the chosen action
steps or plans and understand the feasibility of implementation. The
collaborative element of OD exists because, in part, OD is based on action
research.

Evolution of OD Research
Studies of OD, in general, fall into three chronological groups. The first
consists of case studies. The second group contains criticism of the
methodology of the first group and suggests standardized evaluation
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criteria. The third group addresses the criticisms raised by the second
group by using more complex analytical methods.
The first group of OD studies contains representations of OD efforts.
In these early studies, the OD researchers simply describe and then
assert that a project seemed to work or not; conclusions and
recommendations were speculative (See Argyris, 1970; Burke, 1982;
Kotter, 1978; Pfeffer, 1981). Early on, presentations of cases as
examples of how to conduct OD, combined with the researcher’s
perceptions of how well OD worked, were all that existed. They cannot be
considered as evaluations of OD’s effectiveness because their purpose
was more instructive than evaluative.
In the second group, the OD literature shifted focus to the question of
methodological rigor. This shift emerged with Porras and Berg (1978a,
1978b) and Terpstra (1981). Porras and Berg (1978b) concluded in their
meta-analysis that the overall quality of OD research methodology was
questionable. In order to be less questionable, and therefore included in
their meta-analysis, they required a quantitative analysis at the
organization level, and included only studies conducted in large
organizations. Porras and Berg (1978a, 1978b) screened out studies of

small groups, ones with human process oriented interventions, and those
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with process-oriented variables, leaving them with 35 studies out of an
original 160. All participation-based studies were screened out of their
study; only those case studies that used closed-ended questionnaires for
evaluation were included (Porras & Berg, 1978b). Porras and Berg
(1978a, 1978b) found, as did Terpstra (1981) that the impact of OD is
more likely to be evaluated positively when evaluated by “less rigorous”
measures.
The OD field then took up the question of the meaning of
methodological rigor. Those in the field tried a variety of presumably
rigorous analytic procedures (Armenakis, Bedeian, & Pond, 1983; Bass,
1983; Randolph & Elloy, 1989; Woodman & Wayne, 1985). The results of
these evaluations showed that OD generally had positive results.
However, the evaluations were not based on the original problems that
had been identified during the diagnosis phase, but rather on secondary
endpoints. This relates to this study because the measures of
effectiveness have not been predetermined.
One factor limiting OD evaluations was that the organizations involved
in change efforts were generally unwilling to declare their problems in a
public setting. This factor complicates using diagnostic information for

evaluations. The research dilemma for OD consultants and the scholars
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who study the field is that they are often restrained from divulging the
confidential, potentially embarrassing, and privileged information
generated during the early phase of the OD process. Instead, secondary
endpoints were used (for example, turnover rates, absenteeism, general
levels of satisfaction, and other issues that were not part of the
problem(s), which initiated the intervention). These hypothesized
endpoints do not indicate whether the intended OD intervention was a
success.
Porras and Berg (1978a) reasoned that since OD is based on the
human relations school of organization theory, and one of that school’s
goals is to focus on the needs of people rather than the system they
serve, then measures that reflect individual satisfaction would indicate a
successful OD project. In other words, the above secondary endpoints
could, in fact, be used as long as they constituted the intended focus of
the intervention. Furthermore, this reasoning goes, those measures could
be used to compare different groups and organizations.
However, using composite measures of the concepts of job
satisfaction, absenteeism, etc. as evaluation criteria for OD’s effectiveness
is a flawed measure of O D, regardless of the phases or intervention.

There is ample evidence to show that job satisfaction varies with
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occupational type (Gruneburg, 1979), and this measure does not have
construct validity because it is not grounded in the diagnosis or the model
of OD. In other words, there may be no intention to increase job
satisfaction, so there would be no reason to expect that it would be an
outcome.
One contribution this study makes is to present some of the diagnostic
information that was generated, rather than relying on proxy measures or
indicators. For the research here, there is a client-centered
characterization of what works or what does not and how that may be
decided. This research project presents a real summary of the issues that
emerged from the OD-based interviews, which were to be the focus of the
intervention, not hypothetical. Understanding the focal issues of change is
a critical step in the diagnostic journey.

Organizational Assessment
Another part of this diagnostic journey is an organizational
assessment. Although there are many organization-wide evaluation
models to choose from (Weisbord, Blake and Mouton, for example), John
Kotter constructed an elegant model for examining organizational change
that is simple yet comprehensive. He called it organizational dynamics
(Kotter, 1978). ‘Kotter’s Wheel’ (see figure below) is a tool that can be
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used to assess an organization’s health (alignment of key elements), and
the potential impacts of changes on key elements. It also may be used to
assist analysts exploring factors influencing organizational dynamics that
are commonly overlooked (Kotter, 1978). It is useful as a tool to visualize
the relationships between seven conceptual elements that he identifies.
The elements are self-explanatory. It is worth noting that Kotter’s
wheel combines elements that approximate different schools of thought on
organizations, such as the formal organizational arrangements from the
classic school, or technology from the systems school. Here, it is
introduced and used in order to conceptually span the different schools of
thought on organizations.

Figure 1 ‘Kotter’s W heel’
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Source of potential
behavior and constraints

>

Impacts on

Source: J.P. Kotter, 1978. Used with permission from the author.
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In the center of the model are the key organizational processes; that is,
the core activities of the organization. Elements affecting this include: (a)
the external environment, (b) employees and other tangible assets, (c)
formal organizational arrangements, (d) internal social systems, (e)
technology of the organization, and (f) the dominant coalition. While the
major elements in ‘Kotter’s Wheel’ have a private sector organization
orientation, the concepts are transferable to public entities. ‘Kotter’s
wheel’ is presented to help bridge the organizational schools of thought,
both as part of the literature and in this study.

Planned Change in Public Organizations

This section begins by tying organizational theory to public
organizations and ends with a summary of constraints on public
organizational change.
It is commonplace to find that organizations embarking on a planned
organizational change express their situation as uniquely daunting. A
defensive routine is often exhibited— problems are attributed to such
factors as the organization being “more complex” for multiple idiosyncratic
reasons than entities that are not facing such challenges. In fact, rather
than being an unfounded complaint, there is evidence that changing public
organizations in general, and more specifically, effectively implementing
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organization development, are more difficult and complex in public
organizations (Carnevale; Golembiewski). However, similar constraints to
change apply to all public organizations, and despite them, planned
organizational change in public organizations can be as effective and
successful as in the private sector (Golembiewski; Robertson &
Seneveratne).
In general, the broader question, whether public organizations are truly
different from private organizations, has been widely examined (Gortner et
al, pp. 19-42). So has the more specific comparison of productivity in
private and public human service organizations (Schiflett and Zey).
Relevant to this study is that public and private organizations exhibit
several important differences related to planned organizational change.
Descriptions of these differences follow.
One difference is that public agencies may employ the legitimate use
of force, whereas private and non-profit organizations cannot. Some
human service organization clients are involuntary, such as someone who
has lost their child to state custody. The involuntary client who is
interacting with the agency for a legally mandated reason will likely feel
coerced and may view interaction with the agency differently than a

voluntary participant who is going to a shopping mall (White, 1991).

37

Consequently, using customer satisfaction with services as an indicator of
the success of organizational change and performance is more complex
for public agencies.
Public and private organizations also differ in their degree of selfdirection, disclosure requirements, and control. This is relevant because it
will dictate the range of options an organization can take in response to
changes in its operating environment.
Public agencies can set legal boundaries for private and non-profit
organizations’ range of actions, authorize their existence, and define them
as legal entities; the reverse is generally not true. A notable exception is
litigation, in which a private entity can compel a public entity to take certain
actions. Even though setting organizational boundaries affects both types
of organizations, public organizations have the added hierarchy of levels
of government, rules, contracts, and legislation that set boundaries. What
constitutes a legitimate activity for a public organization is publicly defined.
Moreover, the boundaries for a public organization’s actions are
determined through public discourse, via the disclosure requirement. In
large part, a public agency’s mission, policies, programs, and resources
are determined through a public deliberation process. This requires the
majority of an independently elected legislative body to set law, rule, and
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appropriation, so that even changes implemented “with all deliberate
speed” can actually take a long time. The amount of discretion afforded a
public organization is similarly determined. Thus, taking any action is
simply more cumbersome in a public organization. In contrast, a private
entity can be autocratic; it can dissolve itself, choose not to undertake an
action or implement a program, can alter policies, and can unilaterally
change its mission or structure without engaging in the level of public
discourse or the level of transparency required of a public entity. Thus, it
can act relatively swiftly. One might say it must be able to do this in order
to survive.
In addition, while a poorly performing public agency will not necessarily
cease to exist simply because of poor performance, the same is not true
for a private entity. Public entities could be considered monopolies
because they control the ‘market’ for their services. An increase in the
demand for services or number of clients a public agency serves may not
indicate that the agency is more effective (Golembiewski). For example,
there may be an increased demand for social services due to an economic
downturn. In contrast, an increase in market share or demand can mean
success for a private company and more closely influence the

organization’s actions. Similarly, financial rewards (through revenue and
expenditure increases or decreases) or even the continuation of the public
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entity itself is not necessarily related to the public organization’s
performance as directly as in a private organization (Schiflett and Zey).
Public organizations are entrusted with executing the public will as
expressed by elected officials. Consequently, individual public employees’
discretion is limited in order to meet set fiduciary and ethical standards,
maintain public confidence, and demonstrate accountability.
Accountability requires structural controls and administrative oversight,
and open processes. Failures are intrinsically public.
In describing the relationship between public administration and
organization development, Carnevale (2003) concluded, “the operating
context of public organizations is different from the private
domain...research shows that public OD faces a set of significant
challenges not found in the private sector because of these variations.”
Despite this, he stated, “encouraging data is found that suggests that
public OD is as successful, and perhaps realizes slightly more positive
outcomes, than private experiences” (pp. 36-37).
As was ultimately revealed in this study, changing social values,
shifting political coalitions, and unpredictable economic conditions all alter
the context within which public organizations operate and significantly
affect organizational change efforts. These conditions can result in
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ambiguous, if not conflicting, direction. State agencies operate under
charters from the federal as well as the state level. This results in the
public administrator being left with the unenviable task of resolving
multiple distinct mandates in order to implement public policy.
The origin of all of the preceding differences between public and
private entities is probably rooted in the U.S. political culture, which
intentionally makes radical independent change difficult (Dolbere &
Edleman; Jansson, Pitkin; Fenno, Devine). The fractured nature of
government and the diffusion of power in the U.S. make organizational
change difficult, unless there is a sustained and cohesive shift of
ideological majorities at all levels of government.
Other difficulties unique to public organizations were enumerated by
Golembiewski (1985). According to Golembiewski, constraints to
effectively implementing planned organization change in public
organizations can be narrowed to thirteen factors. Table 1 below
summarizes these factors and the number of times Golembiewski (1985)
identified them in studies of public organizational change.
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Table 1 Rank Order of State-Level Change Constraints

Constraint
1. Procedural regularity and rigidity
2. Lack of professionalism
3. Weak chains-of-command
4. Lack of economic incentives and market indicators
5. Volatile political/administrative interface
6. Legal restrictions
7. Drawing boundaries
8. Diverse interests, values and incentives
9. Complexity of objectives
10. Public scrutiny and suspicion
11. Multiple access
12.Quasi-governmental action
13. Short time-frame

Count
17
14
11
10
7
6
4
4
4
3
1
1
1

Source: Golembiewski (1985) pp. 45-71.

The reason for highlighting differences between public and private
organizations is to emphasize the point that impediments to successful
organizational change are not the same for the two types of organizations.
While each constraint listed by Golembiewski may have an analogous
private-sector counterpart, they have more influence in the public sector,
and therefore forces precipitating and facilitating organizational change in
public organizations need to be stronger and more sustained. In order to
refine an understanding of public organizational change, Golembiewski’s
constraints were directly compared to those found in this study.
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Planned Change in Public Human Service Organizations

In addition to the long-standing interest in integration for the benefit of
clients, financial pressures have compelled states to consider restructuring
as a way to cut costs while maintaining benefit levels. Twenty governors
initiated restructuring plans for 2002 and 2003. Human services and
workforce development systems were included in restructuring plans in
many of those states (Chi, et al. 2003). Despite the frequency with which
elected officials attempt to demonstrate responsiveness to client needs
and financial pressures by initiating reorganization, there has not been a
commensurate level of research on planned change efforts in public
human service organizations.
The most prominent studies on planned organizational change in
public human service organizations are from Lynn (1980), Owens (1985),
and Pindus et al. (2000). The studies by Lynn (1980) and Owens (1985)
both examined restructuring state-level human service organizations.
These studies focused on the legislative intent of the reorganization efforts
and centered their analyses on the views of the elected officials and key
administrators as their measure of success. The authors used
comparative case study analyses—six states in Lynn’s work (1980) and
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eight in Owens’s (1985). They concluded that the results, in terms of
meeting the legislative intent, were mixed.
One of Lynn’s (1980) more pertinent observations related to the
catalyst for change. He found that it was not for the benefit of the client;
rather it was that “state officials have on the whole a greater sense of
responsibility toward economy and efficiency in government operations
than they do toward the effectiveness or coverage of human services”
(p. 178). He also found a lack of long-term commitment to the
reorganization effort; successive administrators had little interest in
sustaining the work of his or her predecessor (pp. 60-64). More
specifically, Lynn (1980) concluded that reorganization efforts in human
services, while overtly purported to be based on the objective of
increasing efficiency and providing better client services (through a
reduction in duplication and increased integration), were actually intended
to increase the control of legislatures or governors over the departments.
Building on Lynn’s work, in “Some Limits on the Uses of
Reorganization,” Owens (1985) concluded that restructuring by itself does
not necessarily lead to improved organizational effectiveness. Like Lynn,
Owens saw little successful reorganization of the public human service

sector in the eight case studies he explored. He reasoned that there was
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not adequate “reintegrating the work of program development with the
work of managing support services” (p. 47). Owens suggested that
“reorganization can be a useful response to the need to change
processes, but it should be seen as supportive of changes in the process
rather than causative.” He added that
the classic guides to reorganization, such as the principles of
departmentalization, do not offer a complex enough model of the
structural requirements of the new and desired changes in
organizational process (p. 48).
Owens (1985) concluded that changing the organizational structure
does not necessarily lead to process changes. The two methods for
achieving organizational change, changing structure versus change
through process, are based on different types of organizational theories,
and exemplify the classic and human relations schools of organization
theory respectively.
However, in the studies by both Lynn and Owens, the authors
observed that the restructuring process was thought to lead to process
assessments that, in turn, may have led to increased intra-agency
communication and greater clarity about roles, goals, and the employees’
purpose in the organization (Lynn, 1980; Owens, 1985). The restructuring
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of the State of Washington’s human service agency was examined in both
studies. In one study, the Washington Human Services Department was
decentralized, while in the other study, five years later, it was centralized.
The studies’ authors were unable to define success or employ objective
measures. Instead, both studies indicated that policymakers thought the
respective change effort was relatively successful, even though the
structural changes reversed each other. They concluded that the process
of change itself was perceived as being beneficial, while the structural
changes were ancillary.
One exploratory study (Jaskyte, 2003) examined the relationship
between employees’ perceptions of leadership behavior, job design, and
organizational arrangements to job satisfaction and commitment. It
examined employees’ perceptions in a public housing authority
undergoing change. The author concluded that there were significant
relationships between perceptions of leadership and predictors of job
satisfaction.

Public Human Service Policies
The types of policies public human service organizations implement
may complicate their efforts at organizational change. State-level human
service organizations in the United States, for the most part, are
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responsible for administering what are called ‘redistributive policies’, which
includes reallocating money from one group or class to another, with the
intent of redistributing wealth based on need (Ripley and Franklin, 1986).
Ripley and Franklin (1986) described three other policy categories distributive, competitive regulatory, and protective regulatory. A
distributive policy is one in which incentives, such as tax credits or
subsidies, are used to induce specific actions that are deemed generally
beneficial. Primary consideration is not given to the recipient’s individual
need. This is typically not one of the policy areas of public human service
organizations. Public human service organizations do, however,
implement protective regulatory policies, such as health provider licensing,
public health-restaurant cleanliness, and child protective services. To a
lesser extent, they may also engage in competitive regulatory policies,
such as approving the construction of a hospital through a certificate of
need process.
Redistributive policies are implemented through what are typically
called welfare programs, such as Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF) and public health care services, such as Medicaid
(Chambers; Jansson; Karger and Stoesz; Lowi, Ripley and Franklin). In
comparison to regulatory and distributive policies, redistributive policies
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have the highest degree of political-ideological conflict, complexity, and
controversy over their implementation (Ripley and Franklin).
This type of policy often becomes the most salient issue in political
debates and electoral politics. There is a strong association between
political party identification and views of redistributive policies (Carmines &
Stimson, 1980; Jackson, 1975). Similarly, Jansson (1997) described an
association between different political ideologies and social policies, views
of government, people, and the economy. For example, ‘conservatives’
were described as advocating a meager safety net and ‘liberals’ as
desiring a relatively generous safety net (pp. 4-7).
The final form that redistributive public policies take reflects the
contentious nature of public policy perspectives, particularly regarding
redistributive programs. When lawmakers do not have a clear consensus,
the resulting laws and funding embody the lack of cohesion and may even
contain contradictions (Chambers, Lipsky). One consequence of this
ambiguity is that it may afford the ‘street-level bureaucrat,’ the one who is
charged with interpreting and implementing the policy, a high degree of
discretion, in addition to unclear and sometimes conflicting program goals
(Derthick, Lipsky). Lipsky writes, “one of the features of many public

services is the ambiguity and multiplicity of objectives” (p. 164). The
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relevance for this research is to point out that even directives that have the
potential for being an external trigger for change, or for being a metric of
success, are mired in complexity. In other words, without clear, specific
objectives, it is impossible to determine when change should take place,
or to know when success has been achieved.
One example of the conflicts that state-level public human service
organizations face is illustrated by two almost contradictory federal
initiatives. Over the last few decades, federal revenue sharing practices
have changed and, consequently, states have had to modify how they
administer programs in order to maintain funding sources. The 1996
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) resulted in increased state-level policy discretion,
simultaneous restrictions on funding to states, and stricter limits on how
long and under what circumstances an individual may receive welfare
benefits. At the same time, states were required to expand health care
coverage through Medicaid demonstration waivers to the Social Security
Act, and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP).
Through the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress modified the Social
Security Act and created Title XXI, SCHIP in order to increase the number
of children with access to health care. SCHIP is a federal-state
partnership, similar to Medicaid, with the goal of expanding health
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insurance to children whose family incomes are too high to be eligible for
Medicaid, but who cannot afford to purchase private insurance
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services administers both
programs. The former program’s objective, broadly stated, is to restrict
the number of individuals who may receive benefits, as well as the
duration of benefits, while the objective of the latter is to expand the
number of people served. Public servants were thus faced with
apparently contradictory expectations: to increase, simultaneously, the
number of individuals covered by public health insurance, while at the
same time reducing the number of clients using related public assistance
programs.
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the amendments of 1993 and
1998, constitute other examples of the complex and contradictory nature
of the policies human services organizations must implement. Initially, the
program was administered through the federal Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare. In 1979, that agency was separated into a
Department of Education and a Department of Health and Human
Services. The Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1998 revised and
extended the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The purpose of the revisions was
to enhance linkages between state vocational rehabilitation programs and
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workforce investment activities carried out under the Workforce
Investment Partnership Act of 1998 (WIPA—under the authority of the
Secretary of Labor), and make the Secretary of Education responsible for
coordinating all activities with respect to individuals with disabilities within
and across programs administered by the federal government. This
resulted in three different federal department secretaries setting funding
and administrative criteria for the state agencies.
There is evidence that the ‘welfare reform’ changes such as the 1996
PRWORA have had a negative impact on the staff providing human
services (Qunit, 2001; Freeman). The resulting tumultuous environment
appears to have adversely affected recruitment and retention, and
increased staff burnout (Ewalt, 1998; Golembiewski, et al. 1998;
Landsman, 2001).
Some analysts have concluded that a state-level human service
worker faces a type of ‘task dilemma’ (Blindenbacher, 1999); the dilemma
consists of having to choose between serving the needs of the client and
those of the organization. The human service worker is asked to be
consistent and judicious, and at the same time implement program
changes that are aimed at altering clients’ expectations and their eligibility.
This dilemma may be further compounded by efforts to ‘reinvent
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government’ and reorganize (Karger and Stoesz), which exacerbates the
conflicting “values of social work—democracy, autonomy, and
individualization with the values of bureaucratic rationalization” (Karger
and Stoesz, p. 160). The conflict can be characterized as being between
greater efficiency through routinization and individualized responsiveness.
In addition to the political-ideological conflict induced by the types of
policy the public human service worker implements, some of the services
and programs that public human service workers administer carry with
them the effect of stigmatization and alienation. A stigma is a form of
marginalization—when a client qualifies for an entitlement program, he or
she may also face public disdain (Chambers, 1993; Iverson, 2000). The
social worker may also be influenced by these views. Clients of human
service agencies are not homogenous; the basis for eligibility is made
through a political discourse that has evolved at the federal level and
implemented by states, and then institutionalized. There are variations in
who is considered deserving of public services as well as variation in the
stigma allotted to the types of services.
Because public human service organizations deliver more than one
service, with funding from different federal agencies and different
programs within federal agencies, the literature on public human service
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organizations commonly refers to the need to integrate services at the
point of delivery (Lurie, 2001; Neugenboren, 1991; Rabin & Steinhauer;
Chambers; Lipsky; Pindus et al., 1992). Reorganization, with the purpose
of integrating services, should lead to a synthesis of different programs
and thus resolve some of the above inconsistencies.
Summary
This study adds to the body of knowledge about organizational change
by prospectively using an OD process, applied during a reorganization, to
see if the former could enhance and improve a formal restructuring
process. This dissertation adds to the body of knowledge by documenting
the use and results of the OD methods outlined earlier. This study
assesses the observations and conclusions of earlier research by Lynn,
Owens, and the more recent work of Polend, et al. on changing public
human service organizations.
In addition, by overlaying a more general model of organizational
dynamics (Kotter’s Wheel) in the analysis, imbalances in the change
process that have been overlooked in these earlier studies may be
revealed. This study provides some testable findings on which to base
recommendations for conducting planned organizational change with
service integration as an objective in a public human service organization.
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It is through this process that the politicization of the change process and
its heightened vulnerability during the transition between governors was
observed.
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METHODS
This section presents the central objectives of this research and a
description of the research methods employed in this study.
This project sought to develop a greater understanding of whether: (a)
interventions based on the human relations school of organizational theory
could inform actions reflective of the classic school of organizational
theory, (b) constraints to implementing planned organizational change in a
public agency that have been identified in the literature are identified
through this study, and, if the constraints were encountered, whether
solutions for overcoming those constraints could be generated through a
participatory action research - organization development process; and (c)
the parts of the organization responsible for direct client redistributive
policies and the public administration generalist areas were more
receptive to the reorganization than the agency policy areas whose client
base does not rely on economic means tests.
This research represents a single case study. As such, it represents
an opportunity to explore planned organization change in a public human
service organization.
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This author was a participant-observer in this case study. This
presented an opportunity to have background knowledge and familiarity
with the organization. At the time of the study, this author was the
Evaluation Research Coordinator in the Office of Medical Assistance
Programs in the Oregon Department of Human Services. Consequently,
some of the lessons and conclusions are drawn from and influenced by
this perspective. While there are advantages to this ‘insider account,’
there are also limitations. For example, hearing informal discussions,
comments, and observations undoubtedly influenced this author’s view.
The influence extends, potentially, to defining what may constitute
noteworthy events. Because this is a case study that relied heavily on a
non-probabilistic sample of individual interviews, there is no statistical
generalizability.

Research Objectives
This case study is exploratory and its purpose is to inform theory. The
areas of inquiry were constructed by distilling three views of organizational
change (a) the elements of John Kotter’s integrative model of
organizational dynamics (1978), or ‘Kotter’s Wheel’; (b) the state-level
constraints to planned organizational change identified by Golembiewski
(1982); and (c) the specific barriers to integration identified by Pindus et al.
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(2000) in public human service organizations. The focal areas were
further narrowed to those that were present in all three sources. Table 2
below represents a crosswalk between the constraints to change
(according to Pindus et al. and Golembiewski) and the elements of
Kotter’s Wheel. Conceptually speaking, adding Kotter’s Wheel allowed
the identification of potential constraints to change that were not
addressed by the two other sources.
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Table 2 Constraints to Change, Kotter, Golembiewski, and Pindus et al.
Kotter (1978)
Dominant coalition-goals
and strategies
External environment—task
.
environment
Dominant coalition— personal
characteristics
Formal organizational
arrangements— structure
Formal organizational
a .
.
.
arrangements— structure
Formal organizational
arrangements— operations
External environment— wider
environment

Golembiewski (1982)
Pindus et al. (2000)
Complexity of
m
|s
objectives
__
3
...
,
T.
___..
.
Short time-frame
Time commitment
Diverse interests,
values and incentives
i Procedural regularity
and rigidity
Weak chains-of.
command

Concepts of
coordination
' Performance standards
T
I urt battles

Legal restrictions
Lack of economic
incentives and market
indicators

External environment—wider
Multiple access
environment
External environment— task
Quasi-governmental
action
environment
External environment— wider Public scrutiny and
environment
suspicion
Volatile
External environment— task
political/administrative
environment
interface
Volatile
Dominant coalition
political/administrative
interface
External environment—wider
Drawing boundaries
environment
Lack of professionalism
Social system
External environment— task
Changing caseloads
environment
Union rules, civil service,
Employees and other tangible
geography, leases,
assets
space limitations, client
forms
Technology— methods,
techniques
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At the top of the table are the potential constraining forces identified in
all three sources, followed by those only presented by Kotter and
Golembiewski, and then those found only in Kotter and the Pindus et al.
study. There were no areas that were matches between Golembiewski’s
constraints to change and the Pindus et al. study that were not indicated
by Kotter. Kotter’s wheel, while more general, is also more
comprehensive.
Based on the table then, conflicting goals and objectives, differing time
frames, the interests or motivations of the dominant coalition, and regulatory
procedures are the potential constraints to change that are common to all
three (represented in all three columns and indicated by shading).
Consequently, these constraints were expected to surface in the OD
interviews. Whether these constraints emerged as hindering forces to the
reorganization and its objective of greater service integration was one of the
research questions.
Based on the previous discussion of the influence of different policy
types, it was reasonable to expect that the objective of ‘integrated services’
would be supported throughout the agency. It was also anticipated that the
public administration generalists and policy specialists would differ in their

understanding and support of the reorganization. A generalist was
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distinguished from a specialist because of professional affiliation, training, and
education. A psychiatrist, for example, would be a policy specialist, whereas
a human resources recruiter or computer programmer would be a generalist.
The reason for making the distinction in the types of personnel is tied to the
idea that public human service organization, particularly those that have
public health services as part of their service repertoire, may experience
more variation in their support for reorganization directed toward service
integration. So, a generalist would be expected to be more supportive of
integration than a specialist was.
To clarify this emphasis further, recall the earlier discussion about
policy types and about redistributive policies having the highest level of
ideological contention particularly when it comes to implementation.
Assume the people within the public human service organization hold
ideological views that approximate, at least to some extent, those of the
general public and elected officials. It is reasonable to assume that
personnel within the areas that are related to the traditionally
conceptualized welfare services (Children Adults and Families,
Community Human Services), may perceive the relevance and importance
of service integration, and subsequently support the reorganization, at
higher levels than those areas that do not provide these services.
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Similarly, the magnitude of structural change was thought to be related
to the amount of dependence a particular unit (office or division) had on
state general versus other funds. Areas that had high levels of non-state
funds were expected to remain more intact than those areas with greater
reliance on state general funds. Put another way, policy areas with
budgets that had a higher proportion of their revenue coming from ‘other
funds’ (non-state general funds) would be changed to a lesser degree than
those with a higher share of their budgets from state general funds. The
reasoning was that the conditions or requirements attached to the ‘other
funds’ would serve as unique constraints to centralizing those functions.
In addition, the level of financial independence may influence the policy or
service area’s responsiveness to the agency’s central administration and
legislature.
Here, the percentage of general funds divided by total funds was used
as a proxy for how outside entities may have controlled the office or division
before reorganization and compare that to the new organization structure.
The magnitude of structural change was to be described as large, small,
and no effect based on alterations in reporting relationships and retention
of the original office or division functions and population served.
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Another objective was to find out if the OD process reveals other
constraints that had not been previously considered or identified.
Previous public human service reorganization efforts targeted at
integrating services have encountered constraints. During the course of
this reorganization, this author sought to determine whether the OD
process would be able to identify unique barriers to change in this setting
so that actions to overcome them could be implemented during the
restructuring, thus facilitating attainment of the goal of integrated services.
This study recognizes that it was anticipated that the reorganization
would encounter constraining forces, which could be explicated by the OD
process and then addressed, resulting in the desired outcome of
integrated services.

Figure 2 Change - Study Sequence

Reorganization

Constraining
forces

Integrated services

Organization
Development

The dotted lines with arrows depict indirect but concurrent
relationships. This figure illustrates the expectations that the
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reorganization will encounter constraining forces. It demonstrates that
through a concurrently initiated OD process, those forces can be identified
and a process can be used to overcome them, resulting in moving toward
the goal of integrated client services.
The data generated by the OD process should identify constraining
forces to the reorganization effort. The issues raised in the OD process
allowed a comparison with the specific views of Pindus et al. (2000) about
why integration efforts have not succeeded, and with Lynn’s (1980) and
Owens’s (1985) views about the influence of precipitating forces and
expectations about reorganization, as well as with Golembiewski’s (1985)
view, which is more broadly tied to change in public organizations. More
specifically, one observation was that impediments to the successful
change were largely ‘political,’ in the electoral sense (Lynn, 1980).
Even though Lynn (1980) and Owens (1985) examined the same types
of organizations as that in this study, they concluded that it was the
equivalent of the ‘dominant coalition’, i.e., elected officials, which limited
completion of reorganization efforts. This conclusion was incomplete,
because public human service organizations have successfully
reorganized—even under successive administrations. For exam ple, at
one time Oregon’s Department of Human Services included employment
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services, but that service area became a separate agency and this was
reaffirmed by successive administrations. Similarly, the US Department of
Health and Human Services once included education services as the
Department of Health Education and Welfare, but no longer does. Thus,
organizational changes have occurred in public human service
organizations, and these changes were not undone by successive
administrations. Therefore, the implication that the sole force involved in
the change process in public human service organizations is elected
officials’ influence on initiating or suspending is not sufficient.

Research Methods
This section briefly introduces the methods used in the study and
presents each in its own subsection. The first method, based on OD
protocols, consists of presenting the results of 28 semi-structured
individual interviews of a cross-section of agency personnel to agency
administrators charged with managing the reorganization. The second
method of research was an archival analysis, which included examination
of written source documents, including the state legislation that was
identified as triggering the reorganization and internal and external
assessments of the .reorganization effort.
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The different methods were chosen, in part, because they reflect
different ontological and epistemological orientations. The use of
quantitative and qualitative data, and the non-reactive document analysis,
allowed a crosscheck or validation of the data and observations. Each
method has its own strengths and weaknesses.
The first method used structured interviews and open-ended questions
and was largely exploratory. Participants were selected for interview
based on referral and their position in the organization. Thirty people were
asked to participate and 28 were interviewed. Two were not interviewed;
one person was unavailable due to time constraints within the study period
and the other because of a job reassignment. Cluster directors, union
shop stewards, Service District Area managers and the ‘DHS Survey
Group’—those who assisted in developing an Employee Survey about the
reorganization, were asked to provide at least two names of people to
interview about the reorganization. Potential respondents were emailed a
request to participate (on the State’s system) and provided with an
informed consent form. Not everyone who was recommended was
selected to participate in the interviews. This was in order to reduce the
chance that individual respondents could later be identified by their
‘referrer.’
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The archival data—words and timing of the legislation enabling the
reorganization, and the agency’s self-assessment documents presented to
the legislature—were fixed, unchangeable, and ‘non-reactive.’ This was
useful because having a consistent explanation of the intention of the
legislation is not always possible, because it will often be interpreted in
contemporary terms and context (Johnson & Joslyn). While the words
that were used do not change, their interpretation might.
OP: Interviews, Summary, and Feedback Session
While there are several types of action research (Masters, 1995) and
OD (Burke, 1982: French & Bell, 1990), this study applied a synthesis of
both. It is most succinctly described as survey feedback. The synthesis is
called participatory action research OD (PAR-OD) (Argyris, 1993 & 1996;
Burke, 1982; French & Bell; Frohman, Sashkin and Kavanagh).
The first method of research used in this study is one type of OD. The
one used for this study was based on the description of W.W. Burke
(1982) in Organization Development: Principles and Practices. It consists
of the interview, summary, and feedback stages.

Interviews
Participant Selection

66

Twenty-eight employees were selected for interviews. Individuals were
selected from a cross-section of the agency hierarchy. As mentioned, this
was not a random sample; the selection process was purposive. Directors
in each of the major agency areas, as they had existed in the pre
reorganization structure, were asked to recommend two or more people to
contact to obtain a referral of individuals to participate in the interviews.
Two directors were also interviewed. Union shop stewards were also
asked to recommend potential interviewees. In some instances,
interviewees were asked to identify two other potential interviewees in
other parts of the agency. There were two reasons for this request. One
was that the first method of participant recruitment did not result in the
desired agency representation and the other was to make it more difficult
to attribute any particular comments to an individual.
In a couple of cases, people were chosen at random simply because
they worked in an institution or organization that was geographically
distant from the central office and not represented in the array of
interviewees. An attempt was made to balance the representation of staff
and management. There was at least one interview from each of the
major Service Delivery Areas (SDAs, Central Administration, and the

Policy Clusters, see figure three for an organizational chart). In addition,
interviews were conducted with directors, managers, non-management
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employees, long-term and recently hired employees, as well as people
directly responsible for implementing the reorganization.
It was not possible, based on this process alone, for others within the
agency to know with any certainty whether a person had actually
completed an interview or was asked to refer someone else, only that they
had been included as a potential respondent.
Interview Questions
The following interview questions were based on Burke’s
recommendations in Organization Development: Principles and Practices
(1982) for data collection. The qualifier, ‘when thinking about the
reorganization’, was added at the beginning for the purposes of this study.
An explanation of the purpose follows each question. Each respondent
was given the opportunity to elaborate on or discuss their answers, as
they desired. Note: Because this author was a participant-observer, it is
reasonable to speculate that the responses may be more succinct and use
more acronyms than respondents may have used if the interviewer had no
familiarity with the agency.

When thinking about the reorganization process, what is working well?
This question seeks to ascertain sources of pride for the group, i.e., the
explicit or implicit standards of success. Here “we are looking for the
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aspects of the organization that are pluses and therefore should be
affirmed, maintained, and strengthened rather than changed.” (Burke)

What is not working so well?
This question seeks to ascertain the potential sources of problems and
the “change emphasis will focus on client responses to” this question.

How does what is not working so well impact your work?
This question encourages reflection on the links between behaviors
and perceived need to change. That is, it allows individuals an opportunity
to screen out earlier responses if they see that an earlier response does
not affect their work. On the other hand, after articulating a link, they may
perceive greater impact on their job and therefore have a deeper sense of
commitment to change.

If there were three things you could change, what would they be and how
would that improve the organization’s effectiveness?
This question is designed to identify potential solutions to the issues
identified.
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What are the obstacles to implementing those changes?
This question helps to gauge what is perceived as amenable to change
and what is not, and provides a foundation for action planning.

What might you personally be willing to do to overcome the obstacles?
This question returns the issues to a personal level; the objective is to
demonstrate, when summarized later, a general degree of commitment to
facilitating change (p.201).
Interview Summary
The interviews were transcribed and then paraphrased into a feedback
summary. According to Burke, in describing the process for analyzing and
reporting, the summary feedback report should ‘take no more than two
pages, reflects only what two or more people stated in their interviews’ (p.
207). The summary represents consolidated statements or phrases,
following each question, ranked by how many people made essentially the
same statement or used the same phrase (pp. 206-207).
In addition to this procedure, a second party reviewed the interview
transcripts, without respondent identifiers, and compared the interview
notes to the summary, for clarity and consistency in inclusion versus
exclusion decisions. CDC EZ-Text was used to examine the interview
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transcripts to validate the summary and to guide preparation of the
interview summary.
This qualitative research software was selected after comparing
strengths and weaknesses of those on ‘the market’ at the time. Table 3
below presents a summary of the type of operating systems, the intended
use, the costs, and capability of multiple user analyses. The software
proved to be unnecessary to create the summary. However, it was helpful
for checking how the summary was constructed
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Table 3 Qualitative software considered
e £
M .i
CO CO CO CO

CO CO

CO

CO CO CO

CO

CO cO CO

05
■f f

s
o c*>

co
>"
o
<c
o

> >

CM.

o o o
c " <Qc C
« c
2i
Q
to to to to

o
«sar

U"im«

l i'u'i

u j

u j

to

ry
O

nr
o o ct
o O
Cd o£

C7I
E5
c in s§

| ii,ii m
i

G
j

to

DC
O

to to

a;

—

to
cs to
' er

j
«§
oo jsi* I***x

OH> >cra< co
era
cz eera
z
!?»
O «o J5s»
>
X

p.'"—
■

■niujii
fejgSS

to

K2 "^dh t z x f
S
?
C
/y5«
2
H
! c"i.io
ic"
3 w
.......
n.
JEu j^ 1" l'«|
!■■
nm
CC j

I...

3? S Q ^

fc—SST]

cz
<££
tn x c o
21 C O CO
.....

era

sH
X

cr»

ftifi mi
l-wp—»

>
<
er>
ET CO

O
O

*3

CCS

§
C
C
S
eZ?

CO

ud
CD

I
fcT

<

13
a>

cn
<C
CD
CO

c3 S

a
uo

03

eJ
-6
da
*/s
ia j 4^
qn

CT3

U■
S
M

Z3 a
<c a Z3
o
*
f
SS O
C
O
c§ O

&
3=

72

03 -g.
jr:
O
Q l T
CD 0
3
K
>- £
CO
m
r y * ■fi
m ,<J5 05

w

€3

Key (1)M rebiever (TR) Jatbase Manager (TEM), Code & Retrieve (CR), Theory Building Software (TBS).
(2) Electronic Text (ET), Digital Mo (DA), Graphics(G), Digital Video fDV), (3)$<2f», $1=200-300, III >

to s

Feedback meeting
The feedback protocol states that the meeting facilitator sets the tone
for the meeting. The purpose of the meeting was reiterated and
background materials were presented. At the beginning of the session,
participants were reminded that the interview summary reflects peoples’
perceptions. This can be an uncomfortable meeting, particularly when the
content is directed toward one of the meeting’s participants. The protocol
includes setting some ‘ground rules’: To wit, people can request
clarification, but are asked to avoid questioning the validity or source of
the perceptions; it is made clear that everyone will be given an opportunity
to be heard; people are allowed to add to the summary list; and everyone
must agree on the ground rules before the interview summary is
presented.
The interview summary was read aloud, question-by-question and
theme-by-theme within each question. After reading the report, there was
a debriefing which asked: ‘Were there any surprises?’, ‘Which of these
concerns is most important?’, Which is second, third, etceteras?’, Which
area of concern would you like to address first?’, ‘Are options presented
that you would like to try?’, ‘Might any of the information from the

interviews lead to changes in the employee survey or the restructuring
process?’, and W hat might those be?’ The responses to these questions
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became the action plan. The session was closed by recapping
agreements and further steps were generated from responses to the
questions above.
Document Analysis
The documents included the legislation enabling the reorganization,
recent budget documents, and meeting minutes. There were two reasons
for examining the enabling legislation and archives. One was that
previous studies of human service organization restructuring indicated that
the purpose of the restructuring was to increase gubernatorial or
legislative control (Lynn, Owens). It was important to see who (the
legislature or the governor) initiated the reorganization and, if possible, to
determine why. Sometimes legislation includes a statement of policy or
objectives. For the most recent reorganization legislation, no policy
statement or objective was included. The second reason for examining
the enabling legislation was to assess the level of ideological conflict over
the restructuring process by examining the partisan breakdown of votes.
Of particular importance was the content of the reorganization plan,
which included goals and a chronology of the reorganization. Progress
reports and the latest budget documents were also reviewed. Given the
volume, only the relevant component parts are summarized here.
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A serious attempt was made to obtain copies of the empirical research,
studies, and reviews that went into planning the reorganization in order to
understand the theoretical premise of the reorganization; the original
documents were lost due to staff changes and geographic reassignment.
Progress reports were used instead, as they showed progression from the
naive model to the evaluative-scanning model (Lawler et. al.) of
organizational change.
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REORGANIZING THE OREGON DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES
This section presents a brief historical context for the latest
reorganization effort, followed by a more detailed description of the
proposed changes.
In 1971, the Oregon Legislature created the Oregon Department of
Human Resources, bringing together a number of existing agencies that
provided social service. The goal was a more unified approach to
delivering services and helping clients. The 2001 Oregon Legislature
reorganized the department and changed its name to the Oregon
Department of Human Services.
The original Department of Human Resources was comprised of
the Division of Children Services, Corrections Division, Health Division,
Employment Division, Mental Health Division, Special Programs Division,
Division of Vocational Rehabilitation and the Public Welfare Division.
In 1977, the Public Welfare Division became the Adult & Family
Services Division. In 1981, the state’s Office of Elderly Affairs was
brought into the department as the Senior Services Division. The Office of
Alcohol and Drug Abuse Programs was created in the DHR Director’s
Office in 1985.
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In 1987, the DHR Corrections Division was abolished and a
separate Department of Corrections was established to operate
correctional institutions and administer correction programs.
The Mental Health Division was changed to the Mental Health &
Developmental Disability Services Division in 1989. The Health Services
Section of Adult & Family Services became the DHR Office of Medical
Assistance Programs in 1990, with responsibility for administering the
state’s low-income medical coverage program, Medicaid.
In 1999, the department was renamed the Department of Human
Services, and the last major reorganization that integrated service delivery
and consolidated the central-office functions that support the work of field
staff began in 2000. The existing DHS divisions were dissolved and their
service-delivery operations were merged (Oregon Blue Book, 2005)
The remainder of this section is drawn from documents produced by
the Oregon Department of Human Services: Remaking DHS,
Reorganizing the Department of Human Services (February 2001), The
Phase Two Report (August 2001), and The Phase Three Report (March
2002). These show the organizational structure before reorganization, the
proposed structure, and the plan’s implementation timeline.
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Proposed Changes

Organizational Structure
The reorganization plan was described in general in Remaking DHS.
Reorganizing the Department Of Human Services (February 2001, version
1.0). According to the reorganization plan, the key elements were focused
on structural change.
The proposed structure consisted of six divisions in three program
offices, five of which provided services through separate networks of field
offices. The new structure combined these front-line service functions into
a single, integrated Field Operations group. The plan also created an
administrative support group; the Continuous Systems Improvement
cluster, which focused on research, evaluation, workforce development
and other activities; and three policy and program groups (p.6).
Figure 3 below shows how the organization looked until 2001.
According to the plan, researchers “found that Oregon’s human service
agency is one of the most broadly focused in the country. Only Montana,
North Carolina, and Vermont agencies encompass such a wide range of
services” (p. 16).
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Figure 3 Structure Before Reorganization
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Figure 4 Proposed Organizational Structure

Director

As discussed later in the results section, all the divisions, offices, and
programs in organizational units, within the Department of Human
Services, were abolished by the legislature through House Bill 2294, to be
effective July 1, 2001. One premise of the new structure was to
consolidate administrative functions—those that were not related to policy
areas such as health or income maintenance— into clusters. The intention
was also to have the new policy ‘clusters’ support the field office structure.
The implementation schedule was divided into four phases described
in Table 4 below. Each phase had a number of actions that were to be
accomplished within that phase, although it was noted that some overlap
was possible.

Table 4 DHS Reorganization Timeline
Reorganization Timeline
The Planning Phase— Prior to June 2001

Local service integration pilot projects
Senate Bill 303 gives the director more flexibility to manage DHS
DHS collaborates state and local partners on Strategy for Social Supports
200 task forces, groups, including staff and stakeholders, work to redesign DHS
DHS names administrators and reconfigures cabinet_________
Administrative services are consolidated_____________ _________________
The Setup Phase—July-December 2001

_________________ __________

SPA managers and their management teams are hired
____________
Identify performance measures, training and organizational development needs
Begin implementing human resources strategy for staffing the department
Identify local stakeholder and advisory committee structure
_________
Identify reinvestment strategies and priorities________________ __________
Standardize administrative policies_____________
The Change Phase—January-June 2002__________ ________________

Develop protocols for common case plans__________ ________
Cross-train DHS staff and partners
_________
Finalize performance measures and begin tracking in each SPA______
Reconcile DAS/DHS budget, accounting, and personnel reporting structures
Develop inventory and staffing plan for all horizontal policy and procedures
groups (e.g., housing, transportation, and employment)
_____
Local work plans for integrated service delivery model are complete
The Systematization Phase—July-December 2002__________

Analyze first year’s data and performance measures and make modifications
Develop protocols for all new programs and grants______________________
Develop new cost allocation plan_________________________ __________
Analyze impact of reorganization on federal funding and reporting procedures
Implement standard contracting templates, forms, policies and procedure
SDAs continue implementation of local service delivery model components
Develop a unified department budget for ‘03-‘05_____________
Organizational problem-solving and recovery systems implemented
Full Implementation— January-July 2003_________________ _

Identify, analyze and develop process improvements for DHS community
contracting practices
SDAs fully implement integrated service delivery model___________________
Regular schedule of DHS performance measurement reports in place________
Management Information Systems in Place______ _____________
Reorganization has been fully implemented_______________ ____ _
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Source: Remaking DHS Phase 3 Report, Oregon Department of Human
Services, March, 2002.
Changes to Field Structure
One of the more visible changes was a revision of the field office
structure. Programs had previously organized their own local offices.
According to the reorganization plan there was to be ‘no wrong door’
through which clients would access the service to which they were
entitled. In the past, clients had to visit different offices in order to receive
different kinds of services. After consultation with stakeholders, such as
local governments, courts, and tribes, the state was divided into 16 service
delivery areas (SDA) (see map below).
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Service Deiiveiy Areas

Figure 5 SDA map
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The delivery areas were configured to allow implementation of a
service delivery model (see Figure 6). Some noteworthy characteristics of
this model are (a) development of an integrated service plan that is
facilitated by an integrated service coordinator, (b) acknowledgment of the
provision of involuntary services, and (c) acknowledgment of the
interdependence of the agency and community support services.
Figure 6 Client Service Delivery Model
Client
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Referral

Integrated
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Source: Remaking DHS Version 1.0, State of Oregon Department of
Human Services, February 2001, p. 34
SDAs were to implement the integrated human services model in
phases according to the following timetable (Table 5). The SDA area
numbers in Table 5 correspond to the numbers from the map on figure
five.

Table 5 SDA Implementation Timeline
Area

Start Date

SDAs 3, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 13
September 1, 2001
SDAs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 12 and 14
November 1, 2001
January
1, 2002
SDAs 9, 15 and 16
Source: Phase II Report: Service Delivery Areas Reorganizing, August
2001 .
Each SDA was to spend the first months orienting staff and partners to
the client service delivery model (Figure 6), and customizing the model for
local implementation. The SDAs were also to build skills in unified case
planning and multi-specialist teamwork, and reflect DHS customer service
values and practices. Stakeholders and advisory groups were to be
involved in this process. Although area-policy specialties were to be
preserved, cross-training was to be provided for several months to assist
staff as they made enhanced community referrals, wrote unified case
plans, and provided holistic supports for clients with multiple needs (DHS,
2001 ).

86

Anticipated Barriers
Those developing the reorganization plan identified potential barriers to
implementing it. They articulated a number of legal issues such as:
1. to whom and how child abuse and neglect reports must be made
and who would be responsible for placing children in protective
custody;
2. cost-sharing, confidentiality, and reporting relationships regarding
vocational rehabilitation services;
3. determining what kind of client information divisions and partners
can exchange;
4. mandates related to court settlements— referred to as the ‘Staley
agreement’ and the Juvenile Rights Project Agreement, related to
access and distribution of services (Remaking DHS, 2001, pp. 4344).
The architects of the reorganization anticipated constraints. These
included financial concerns, such as perceptions of shifting costs to other
agencies within the state, increased charges to programs within the
agency and to other levels of government; impacts of personnel relocation
on creativity; disruption of external relations with the legislature, local

governments, providers, advocates, and tribal governments; and the
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entrenchment of the culture of each division in the program office
(Remaking DHS, 2001, pp. 46-47).
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RESULTS

What follows are the results of this research, starting with a
summary of the interviews that were conducted during the reorganization.
OD Interview Summary and Feedback Session

Summary o f Interviews
The summary that follows is presented in the same order that the
interviews were conducted. The themes (a theme is when two or more
people gave the same response) that emerged in response to each
question are followed by specific examples of responses and
demonstrates how the themes were constructed. The summary is
presented in the order that the questions were asked and, following each
question, in descending rank order of response occurrence. As per Burke,
at least two people had to identify a theme for it to be included, and when
there was not an overarching concept, but the responses were similar,
paraphrased verbiage was used. ‘Descending rank order’ means that a
theme is higher in the number of occurrences. It does not reflect the
relative importance of each theme. Put another way, this is an ordinal
ranking.
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The same caution holds between questions. That is, the first ranked
theme in response to the first question may not be of the same importance
as the first ranked theme from the second. Following each interview
question is the major theme, written in italics, which emerged in response
to the question, and below each major theme are examples of the types of
things that were said in the interviews.
1. When thinking about the reorganization process, what is working well?
Improved communication
Communication between former divisions has increased
Increased awareness and active engagement of stakeholders
Better collaboration, teamwork, and cooperation
Better use of existing resources
Infrastructure impediments to integration are being identified and
addressed
Clearer reporting structure and process
Clearer lines of authority
Consistent administrative policies
A better understanding of our purpose, the process forced reflection
Talking about change makes us think about what we are doing
A change in atmosphere
Learning from our mistakes
Leaders are emerging & not because of their position
[Miscellaneous]
Uncertain
Too early to tell
Not sure
Does not directly affect us. Been at this for a long time
90

It is more targeted toward the field structure
2. What is not working so well?
Pace
Has taken forever
Expect change overnight
The policy folks have time to think these things up and we are
trying to keep the wheels on
Managing change & leadership style
Interpreting, pointing out problems is seen as resistance
Creating fear; unprofessional, hostile environment,
condescending
High expectations for staff, some weren’t hired for the job they are
being asked to do and it requires a fairly high skill set
We need to honor parts of the existing culture and relationships
Leadership doesn’t inspire, we hear the message ‘if you don’t like
it leave’
Organizational culture— communication
Culture isn’t conducive to total increased integration
Field offices don’t think we know what we are doing unless we
came from there
There’s a disconnect between central office and the field offices
Our group has a culture and values
We have these clusters with no identity
A lot of what we did was about relationships that have been
broken
Confusion & the ‘real reason’ for doing this now
Some changes were already underway
Seems like reshuffling just to make it look like we’re doing
something

We may be doing this now for budget reasons, staff reductions
Training and professional specialization
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Training needs to be examined; are we doing the right kind; can
we really train-up to meet the demand?
Some people are having trouble with professional identities, they
don’t know if the organization just wants generalists or if they
value professional expertise
Infrastructure
Infrastructure is really where the change is needed, forms and
information systems should be uniform
Should’ve looked at what it’s like in the offices first and built the
infrastructure from there
We need current computer systems, telephone systems, and
Phonebooks

The meaning o f integration
We need practical evidence or examples of implementation of the
integration and the resulting changes
Global thinking isn’t always practical in real terms
There’s a difference between reorganization, relocation, and
service integration
Client needs should be driving this change
There is no single ‘human service’ policy nor supporting state or
federal budget
Federal financial participation
Federal financial participation reinforces old structure
3. How does “what is not working so well” impact your work?
Unclear communication & who to turn to
The changes have slowed communication & ability to respond to
client needs
Direction and how to set priorities is unclear
Hard to know what ‘doing a good job’ means—what does this
mean in a specific street-level way?
Contractors do not know who they are supposed to talk to
High expectations—asked to change yet still provide the same service
Unlike other parts of the agency, we have developed relationships
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with the clients that span many months, in some cases years
4. If there were three things you could change, what would they be and
how would that improve the organization’s effectiveness?
Use the clients’ needs as the trigger for change
Base the integration on the client’s view
Assess the client’s experience and build around that
Focus on infrastructure and support services, reorganize if client
services are impacted
Training and skills
I would have put technology changes in place first, behind
changes in the field office structure
Develop, change management skills
Organizational climate, expectations, culture
Acknowledge that this can take a long time; there are lot of
impediments that are real
Disconnect the big reorganization from integration
It’s more than a vision; find out how people understand integration
and build a new culture around that
Rethink the vision; way oversimplified
We need to have a better way of describing what’s going on as
it’s changing
I’m not sure even the Cabinet [the cluster level managers and
administrators] knows what’s going on
We need to have a better understanding of what integration is
versus collaboration or consolidation
Rethink the cluster— administrative concepts
Separate health into a different department
Develop a transitional organization
I’d figure out a better way of sorting out what was general
administrative, what was direct service, and what was policy
New policies and procedures need to be more explicit about the
connection to greater service integration
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We need to allow field staff to suggest workarounds and give
them the power to do it
5. What are the obstacles to implementing those changes?
Finances
It’s a resource issue
We had to do this without any money
People are afraid to ask the legislature for the resources that are
really necessary to change
Technology
The technology is lagging
Leadership
The right kind of leadership
We don’t have the time or leadership
Commitment made to legislature to show results
We set ourselves up for an all or nothing
The pace was slow and then nearly panic now; we are under
pressure to produce, to show results
I don’t think the governor really supports the employees
In the field of human service, it’s particularly important to
demonstrate that feelings and ideas are understood
Personalities, personal ambition, excessive emphasis on control
Federal partners
They need to be willing to be flexible, cooperate with each other
and us
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6. What can be done to overcome the obstacles?
Recognize that the rate of change is a matter of perception and
depends on your job
Develop a matrix of all the programs we have and really figure out
where there’s cost-cutting features
Figure out a replacement culture
Show that promotions and rewards are tied to the goals of the
reorganization
Make the driving vision come from the field offices
To paraphrase these interviews in a different way, it appears there was
a cultural clash; communication breakdowns occurred between senior
management and staff, and the ‘central office’ and the ‘field.’ The
reorganization had a disorienting effect on field staff and there did not
appear to be a reorientation scheme. For example, interviewees indicated
they believed they were doing a good job, and then they felt they were
being told that this was not the case. The message that was heard in some
cases was that they were not meeting client needs; this created anxiety and
uncertainty. The disorientation resulted in dissonance and when affirmation or
confirmation was sought from superiors, it was not forthcoming.
Communication channels, formal and informal, were altered because of the
restructuring. The confusion led to speculation about the ‘real’ intent
behind the shifts in emphasis in the reorganization.
This was best demonstrated by the theme that emerged most often the first one below question two: namely, pace. The concerns expressed
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about the pace of the reorganization were contradictory. Field staff
seemed to see the pace as too fast and senior management saw it as too
slow. One interviewee offered this metaphor-insight: “they have time to
think (‘they’ are senior management) while we are dealing with day to day
crises. It’s like trying to change a flat while the car is still rolling.”

The Feedback Session
A feedback meeting was set up and held one month after the final
interview. A few days before the meeting an informal discussion with key
management occurred, to reduce the potential shock of the number of
problems perceived as related to management style. Participants in the
feedback meeting were the managers and deputy administrators who
were responsible for the reorganization.
The meeting began with a reintroduction of its purpose and steps taken
to date. The fact that the data represented the perceptions of staff, and
that these perceptions were neither right nor wrong, was reiterated.
Despite this, as soon as the responses to question two (“what is not
working so well?”) were presented, a comment was made by one of the
managers about the weakness of the qualitative nature of the interviews,
implying that the negative perceptions, therefore, may not be widespread.
While this was obviously a possibility, there were no objections raised to
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the positive responses to question one (“what is working well?”), indicating
a possible defensive routine, as defined by Chris Argyris. Immediate
rejection or questioning of unfavorable data is an impediment to taking
action to address the identified issues. As part of the OD process, this
type of response is considered a piece of data itself, and is pointed out in
feedback sessions.
Overall, however, when asked if the feedback process had been
useful, the participants said that it had, mainly because the results allowed
them to focus on problem areas, reduce uncertainty about which issues
specifically needed to be addressed, and prioritize actions. They also
indicated that the results confirmed suspicions they had already had,
based on informal comments by employees.
When asked what would be a priority or what they saw as the next
step, the discussion turned to what they could realistically change or
address in the short term. The organizational culture became a focus.
They had been considering modifying the employee survey and including
organizational culture as one of the foci. During the prioritization
discussion it was pointed out that there were already various efforts
underway to address the concerns expressed in the interviews, and that
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these efforts were not widely known. They felt that there was a need to
better communicate the successes and demonstrate “wins.”
They suggested employing this interview and feedback process at one
of the ‘successful’ SDAs and at one that was more challenged, to
determine whether solutions to identified problems could be found in the
more successful offices and then transferred to the more challenged ones
(i.e., whether they could be applied in different settings). The meeting was
concluded with an agreement to meet again, and further explore such
possibilities.
Interview Summary Analysis
Table 2 in the literature review presents a crosswalk of constraints to
change. What follows are tables that describe, in a simple count, how
often a particular constraint to change identified in Table 2 also surfaced
as a theme from the interviews conducted in this study. Table 6 below
summarizes the number of times a constraint, identified in Golembiewski’s
meta-analysis, and was expressed in the OD interviews.
The table ranked in descending order of frequency the number of times
Golembiewski’s study identified a theme for his meta-analysis. It would
have been reasonable to expect the top-ranked constants in this study to
match those in the table. However, there were clearly several differences
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between the two, even though both were based on analyses of
reorganizing public organizations.

Table 6 Change Constraints, Golembiewski v. DHS Interview Occurrences

Constraint
Procedural regularity and rigidity
Lack of professionalism
Weak chains-of-command
Lack of economic incentives and
market indicators
Volatile political/administrative interface
Legal restrictions
Drawing boundaries
Diverse interests, values and incentives
Complexity of objectives
Public scrutiny and suspicion
Multiple access
Quasi-governmental action
Short time-frame

r

Golembiewski DHS Interview
Counta
Occurrencesb
17
7
14
6
6
_

_

10

0

7
6
4
4
4
3
1
1
1

0
0
4
4
9
h _

_

_

”

5
1

'
_

Sources: a) Golembiewski (1985) pp 45-71, b) DHS interviews
While Golembiewski had ‘procedural regularity and rigidity’ and ‘short
time-frame’ as separate categories, it may be that the categories are two
sides of the same coin. A time-frame can be perceived as short (too
short) when a person close to the task, not the change facilitator,
envisions all the sequence of steps a change may require under ordinary
circumstances. In other words, the details of each step are clear to the
person closer to the task. The change facilitator may, in this situation, be
committed to demonstrating specific results within a given period and so
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may interpret someone’s detailed explanation of needed steps as a
reflection of rigidity and as an expression of recalcitrance.
Some of the differences may be accounted for by the fact that
Golembiewski’s study was a meta-analysis and included entire
organizations, rather than individual interviews. The studies in his meta
analysis could identify more than one constraining force, whereas the
interviews identified themes in which two or more people had similar
perceptions. In addition, some of the public organization characteristics
that would reasonably be expected to occur did not surface as constraints
at all in the interviews, despite the high number of times they were cited in
Golembiewski’s study. Of particular note was that the ‘volatile
political/administrative interface’ was not found to be a consideration here,
nor was the ‘lack of economic incentive or market forces.’
The studies of Golembiewski, as well as Lynn and Owens, would lead
one to believe that changes were driven or suspended exclusively by
elected officials, and that there was an inevitable elected official vs. public
administrator conflict over the changes. There was no evidence of this in
the current study, and there were, in fact, indications of cooperation. For
example, the House Bill authorizing the reorganization effort w as offered
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by the Governor, at the request of the Agency Director, and passed
unanimously without rancor.
Similarly, Golembiewski’s observations showed little relationship to the
factors that were more common in the interviews. For example,
leadership style and production periods were mentioned often in the
interviews, but infrequently in the meta-analysis.
Kotter’s wheel proved to be a much more effective overlay for
examining the reorganization. While ‘Kotter’s Wheel’ is more oriented
toward private organizations, it was useful to describe and explain the
themes from the interviews. It also helps visualize the interplay between
the key elements, that is, it shows how the high occurrence in one element
affects the remaining elements (see Table 7 below). Put another way, an
overlay of Kotter’s Wheel and the interview themes shows where there
may be imbalances and where to adjust the change process.

Table 7 Change Constraints -Kotter’s Wheel v. DHS Interview
Occurrences

DHS Interview
Occurrences

Kotter (1978)

l—
Dominant coalition-goals and strategies
External environment-task environment
_ _6
Dominant coalition-personal characteristics
10
Formal organizational arrangements-structure
Employees and other tangible assets
_ 14_
Social system
Technology-methods, techniques
8
Key organizational process
6
(‘Kotter’s Wheel,’ used with permission from the author)

_

Restructuring is only one of the elements in Kotter’s wheel. There are
five others (see Figure 1). The ‘formal organizational arrangementsstructure’ was the focal element of this change effort, but the frequency of
the interview occurrences above confirm the importance of the other
elements and their bearing on the key processes. For a reorganization
effort to successfully change the key organizational processes, the
planning needs to take into account all of the elements in Kotter's wheel.
In the study presented here, there was an expectation that restructuring
alone would lead to changes in key processes, resulting in the goal of
integration. However, the magnitude of the interaction between the key
elements does not appear to be equal. There may be greater clientstakeholder influence on the interaction between the elem ents in the case
of public human service organizations because there are linkages external

102

to the key process. The short-term and long-term effects of altering the
key processes, particularly by altering the formal organizational
arrangements, may be for stakeholders to go outside the existing
organization to have their concerns addressed. This was found to be the
case in the study here. The legislature and governor’s office were the
external entities that were approached, while the officials in these offices
were in transition between administrations. This is not the same as a
power or political struggle between branches (Lynn) or between
successive governors as the motivator for change to start or stop.
Future efforts to restructure public organizations need to take into
account all of the elements, and plan for making the changes in a logical
sequence, since there is a dynamic interaction between all the elements.
For example, planned support structures, such as integrated client
information systems, should be in place first, or at least provide
employees with a process to assess program eligibility across the full
spectrum of services. Then, employee training on the new system should
be initiated. The interactions also have both short-range and long-range
effects, and these need to be anticipated and incorporated into the change
plan from the outset. Walking through the desired changes using the

wheel would allow one to envision which elements will be affected and
solutions to anticipated constraints could be incorporated into the change
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plan. In contrast to other public organizations, there are unique
characteristics or features of a public human service organization that may
act as constraints to successful attainment of integrated services.
As the literature review pointed out, Owens only examined one of the
elements; specifically, interactions between the dominant coalition and the
organization undergoing change. The Pindus et al. report did not include
either formal restructuring or the dominant coalition. It included several of
the elements in Kotter’s Wheel, but obviously not all. They also suggested
specific constraints to achieving service integration, which did not emerge
in the themes from the interviews, as shown below.
Table 8 Change Constraints, Pindus et al. v. DHS Interview Occurrences
DHS Interview
Occurrences

Pindus et al. (2000)

Different program goals
Time commitment
Concepts of coordination/ integration
Performance standards
Union rules, civil service
Changing caseloads
Geography, leases, space limitations, client forms
Turf battles

2
11
2
~3-4
0
0
0
0

Of the three sources, the Pindus et al. report was the least comparable
with the interview results in this study and hence the least useful to
understand what someone who was planning to restructure in order to
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achieve integrated client services might encounter. Despite this, the
Pindus et al. report appears to be a primary reference for the analysis of
integrations of state-level human service organizations. Their analysis is
offered as one of only a few resources by the American Public Human
Services Association.
Here, however, Kotter’s wheel proved to be the most comprehensive
tool (accounting for all of the constraints that were identified in the Pindus
et al. report as well as Golembiewski’s study, in addition to the ones that
are unique to Kotter’s wheel), and covering all of the constraints that
emerged from the interviews.

Archival Sources
The document sources of particular relevance to this research included
legislation; the agency’s plans, assessments, and progress reports; and
meeting minutes. The legislation that initiated the restructuring was
examined for indications [consistent with Lynn’s (1980) view] that the
purpose of the reorganization was to increase control by the governor or
the legislature. The original plan and subsequent progress reports were
reviewed to see how the process may have changed and why. Meeting
minutes were reviewed back to 1991, to explore all of the decisions
surrounding the cluster concept, from its initiation forward. Finally, other
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documents were examined and cited here either because they were
referenced in the focal documents or explained some contradictions that
appeared in the interviews.

Legislation
HB 2294 was filed before the official session began (‘pre-session’) at
the request of the governor. This meant that both the governor and the
agency initiated the change; it was a joint agency-legislative concept. The
following is the summary heading of the 155-page House Bill:
Abolishes current divisions, offices, programs, and organizational
units within Department of Human Services. Transfers duties and
responsibilities of the divisions, offices, programs, and organizational
units to Department (p. 1)
The House Bill put the responsibility for restructuring the organization
in the hands of the director of the agency. It required the Oregon DHS to
provide progress reports. The Oregon legislature only meets every other
year, for about six months, and the members are considered part-time. In
the interim, some review, decision-making, and allocation authority is
delegated to an Emergency Board. It was this smaller group (which
cannot make legislative changes) that reviewed the progress reports.
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Because of this, the restructuring was not influenced by continuous
input from an outside entity (the legislature), as might have been the case
in other states. This afforded the opportunity to study a restructuring,
relatively independent from outside influence, as it naturally unfolded. In
addition, unlike previous literature discussing public human services
reorganizations (Lynn and Owens), this study had available the selfevaluative progress reports. These public documents, which provided a
sequential look at the process as it unfolded, were generated and required
to be submitted simply because the Oregon legislature is not continuously
in session.
The legislature approved a 2001-2003 budget based on the
Department’s configuration prior to the reorganization, which was
contained in House Bill 2294 and signed by the Governor in August 2001.
The budget and reorganization bills were passed in the same session.
Figure 7 below shows the proportion of the total funds for each office or
division that were based on general funds (state funds from taxes
excluding tobacco and lottery funds). For the most part, non-state general
funds are federal funds. The figure reflects the organization and funding
patterns before the change.
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Figure 7 2001-2003 State Budget, Department Areas’ % State General
Fund/Total Funds
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of Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Programs, OMAP-Office of Medical
Assistance Programs, DO-Director’s Office
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Figure 8 2003-2005 Budget, Department Areas’ % State General
Fund/Total Funds

2003-2005 Budget %
General / Total
50 %
40%

4 1 . 1%

30 %
2 3 .8 %

20%
10%

2 6 .8 %

12 .7 %

CAF

CHS

HS

DWSS

CAF - Children, Adults and Families, CHS - Community Human Services,
HS - Health Services, SPD - Seniors and People with Disabilities, DWSS Department-Wide Support Services

There were two facets of the reorganization that this study explored by
looking at funding sources. One was to see if there was a relationship
between the percentages of each area’s funding that comes from the state
general funds and its support for the reorganization, and the other was to
examine the relationship between funding and the magnitude of the
entities’ realignment before and after the reorganization. These questions
are based on the Pindus et al. report, which states that federal financial
participation acts as a constraint on the reorganization of public entities
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(the proportion of federal funding being approximately inverse to that
coming from the state).
Figure 8 reflects the DHS funding sources following restructuring. The
former departments of HD (see legend figure legend), OMAP, and
MHDDSD (representing, respectively, departments with one of the lowest,
the middle, and the highest proportions of their budgets coming from state
general funds prior to the restructuring) were consolidated into the Health
Services (HS) cluster. The former division of Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities, the area with the highest percentage of its
budget coming from general funds, was split up; Mental Health was
incorporated into the Health Services cluster and Developmental
Disabilities went into Seniors and People with Disabilities. The former
Health Division, the area with the lowest percentage of its budget from
general funds, except for the Directors’ Office, also went into the Health
Cluster. In other words, no matter what percentage of the office’s or
division’s funding came from state general funds, they were all
dramatically reconfigured. Dependence on state general funds and the
magnitude of change thus appeared independent of one another. The
proportion of non-state funding did not act as a constraint to the

magnitude of the reorganization,
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Archival sources were also valuable in helping explain the finding, from
the interviews, that there were considerable differences in perceptions of
how long the reorganization and integration process had been underway and
how long it would take to see a variety of outcomes. While the Reorganization
Plan (2001) document indicated that it had begun with HB 2294 from the
2001 Legislative Session, reference was made in subsequent progress
reports and in interviews to a Senate Bill from a previous legislative session
two years prior, SB 555. These bills were slightly different in their intention.
SB 555 was consolidation of services for a subset of clients and the focus
of the latter was administrative.
A few sources indicated that the formation of the original agency was an
attempt to combine several state agencies in 1971 for integration of
services. Again, in 1991, this subject was the focus of the legislature;
Oregon lawmakers attempted to integrate human services. They passed a
bill requiring DHS to create what the legislation called “family-centered
human investment demonstration projects” where services were
integrated. These three previous legislative actions were merged as part of
the objectives of the latest reorganization, but this created confusion on the
part of the staff regarding the reorganization timeline. It also appears from the
agency’s Cabinet meeting notes that the actual structure had been suggested
and decided upon many years before the reorganization
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Senior staff who had been with the agency for several years were aware of
the reorganization discussions and planning and the process for laying the
implementation groundwork. Therefore, having been exposed to these
discussions, they did not experience the stress that is ordinarily
associated with change. However, for new staff (such as those in the
Health Services and Finance and Policy clusters referred to above) and
those who were not in close regular communication with executive
management, the change seemed sudden. For those who had new
responsibilities as a result of the change, for example in the Finance and
Policy area, who were responsible for developing budgets based on the
new structure and determining cost allocations, there was an assumption by
senior staff that they had been kept updated throughout the reorganization.
This entity has a centralized function, supporting the director’s office, so it was
an unexpected finding that they were not more engaged in the support of
process. The archival data revealed that a discussion of the reorganization
had been occurring at the cabinet level for at least ten years. One of the
largest areas of the agency that was not affected by restructured reporting
relationships, mostly because the staff had little direct relationship to the field
office structure and client contact, was that related to programs dealing
with public health and with state hospitals; this helps explain the difference
in perceived relevance expressed in the interviews.
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In summary, the initial reorganization goals of the first phases
(Planning, Set-up, and Change) appear to have been met. The fractured
divisions and complex field office reporting structure was changed. There
was greater centralization of administrative functions. However, the final
transition to the systemization phase was not implemented.

Actual Reorganization
An unanticipated, but, as it turns out, very relevant finding of this study,
was the impact of a change in the state Governor on the restructuring.
With the newly elected governor, there was a change in DHS. New senior
administrative personnel were put into place across state government.
DHS found itself with its third director in less than two years. The new
director was asked, by the new Governor, to reassess the reorganization
and determine what should be kept, kept with changes, or abandoned
(personal email correspondence, 11/04).
The new director announced that her reassessment and subsequent
decisions would be based on a variety of sources and would be
responsive to the views of staff and stakeholders. Until the results were
back, the reorganization would be ‘on hold.’ For the reorganization
reassessment, the new director relied on the OD-based interviews and a
high-level summary of them, and several additional sources. To assess
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the scope of the issues identified through the interviews, she initiated an
independent survey of employees conducted by the Department of
Administrative Services. An internally developed Employee survey
solicited responses from employees agency-wide, asking that they let her
know their views of what should be kept, changed, or abandoned.
Similarly, she used the results of semi-structured interviews of senior
administrators asking what should be kept etcetera, as well as the views
of the legislative oversight committee and the governor’s office.
Prior to this assessment, the Continuous Systems Improvement cluster
was charged with coordinating the reorganization. One early action of the
new director, which signaled the direction of subsequent decisions, was to
disband the Continuous Systems Improvement cluster as a separate entity
(Currents, 03/2004).
In order to understand this change in a planned change, this
researcher made an additional inquiry of the incoming director. In a
follow-up, this researcher asked the new director her view on the validity
of previous studies’ conclusions, and whether the reason for changing the
planned change effort was governmental branch or inter-governor political
competition. In summary, the reply w as that the new governor did indeed
ask for the reassessment but not because it had been initiated under his
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predecessor. Rather, she noted, there were stakeholders who contacted
the incoming governor, the legislature, and even the federal government,
outside the formal organization, who expressed dissatisfaction because
they had become disenfranchised, noting a perceived lack of receptivity
on the part of the organization’s previous administration toward
addressing their concerns. She added that this type of intercession in a
change effort was not likely to occur in a private organization (personal
communication, 11/2004).
There were transitions on the elected official level, and a period during
which there was a governor-elect and the incumbent governor, there was
yet another change in agency administrators. There was overlap in the
state’s leadership following the election. These overlaps and transitions in
leadership created discontinuity. The entering leadership reassessed their
current environment, which included the perceptions of disaffected groups
and individuals.
Contrary to the classic conception of public organizations moving
toward stasis, this agency continues to be dynamic. The core of the
organization structure, at the time of this writing, was changed, and
included three policy areas: Seniors and People with Disabilities; Children,
Adults, and Families; and Health Services. It also included three support
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areas: the Director’s Office, Finance and Policy Analysis, and
Administrative Services. The areas of Community Human Services and
Continuous Systems Improvement were not in the final organization
structure. Discussions are also underway for reconsidering the concept of
the Health Services cluster, to evolve into a separate department entirely.
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D ISCUSSION

First Study Objective
The first objective was to find out whether OD methods could inform
restructuring. The original research design anticipated using the results of
two employee surveys and two sets of interviews, one of each conducted at
the beginning and one toward the end of the reorganization effort. As
planned, the first staff survey was deployed, and it generated information
about the understanding of the goals of the reorganization. In addition, the
OD-based interviews were conducted and the feedback session was held.
The information from the interview summary was generally well received
during the feedback session; four of the five key coordinators of the
organization found it informative and stated that they intended to use it to
guide future efforts and construction of a follow-up survey. However,
because the reorganization was suspended, only the first phases of the
OD process were implemented. As noted above, the post -election
director used two surveys and interview summaries to assess the
effectiveness of the reorganization and for deciding its course.
The implementation plan for the reorganization changed, mainly as a
direct result of the public nature of the agency, that is, a regime change at
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election time. The impact of the public nature of the organization did not
emerge from the interviews, even though, in the end, it had the most
significant effect on the reorganization effort. While the impact of changes
in agency directors emerged, changes in the governor had no direct effect.
Most relevant to this research, the incoming agency director
independently chose to use the early phases of the OD process and
questions similar to those presented in this research in order to inform the
entire reorganization effort. The internal staff person who directed the
subsequent data gathering process was trained in and had taught
organization development. She, independent of this research employed
the same process questions, although the interviewees were exclusively
upper management.
Consequently, the answer to a key question of this research, whether
one method of organizational change organization development, can inform
another, the formal restructuring of a public human service organization, is a
qualified yes. Indeed, the information generated informed the choices of
the directors, but not as expected.
Even though the two methods of planned organizational change reflect
distinct schools of organizational theory that have been described as
incompatible (Lincoln, Burrell and Morgan), this work suggested that they
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could complement one another. They were complementary because
information was provided in both directions; that is, the OD process informed
the formal restructuring and the OD process being employed during the
formal restructuring helped identify areas for the improvement of the OD
process itself.
More specifically, in this setting, an OD effort that is tied to
reorganization may need to be designed so that it can be completed well
within one four-year term of office. The early termination of the
reorganization shows that an OD effort, in order to have any potential
effect, has a very narrow window of opportunity to inform a restructuring
effort.
Recall that OD is an iterative process that is composed of phases, the
decision to continue occurs at the last phase of the process. This study
suggests that each phase of OD, when used in tandem with restructuring,
ought to explicitly plan for the termination of either type of change effort.

Second Study Objective
The second objective was to determine whether there was evidence of the
constraints to implementing planned organizational change in a public
agency, that have been identified in the literature, manifesting during this
reorganization. Then, if there were indications of those constraints, to see if
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solutions for overcoming them could be generated through the participatory
action research-organization development (PAR-OD) process.
Golembiewski (1985, p. 51) identified thirteen public-sector constraints to
implementing organizational change that were described in published
literature on the use of organization development in the public sector.
Eight of these constraints were similar for ‘general government’ (1985, p.
64). He further collapsed these eight constraints into internal and external
categories of four each. The data from the organization development
process used in this study revealed two of the constraints that Golembiewski
identified: (a) complexity of objectives, and (b) diverse interests, values
and incentives.
However, this ‘match’ may be the result of the level of generalization of
the concepts and their weakness for use in public administration
organizational change research, rather than a confirmation of their presence.
Although there were perceptions of the existence of ‘diverse interests and
values’ being a constraint, this view was not widely held. The organization’s
‘complex objectives’ were actually seen as a facilitating force for this
reorganization effort and, consequently, cannot be considered a constraint.
The element of complexity of values comes into play. At the early
stages of a change process, unless there are mechanisms to help
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describe and then reflect the organization’s diverse interests and values,
people may not be aware of these until the change ensues and they are
faced with losing something they value but have taken for granted
because it is part of the area’s culture.
There was evidence of combinations of the constraints. For example,
legal restrictions and procedural regularity, imposed when accepting federal
monies, were perceived to limit organizational discretion. In some areas
of the agency, ties between federal revenue and mandatory activities (such
as generating reports, and regulations regarding client interaction) defined
the subculture of areas within the agency and were used to explain why that
area was ‘special’, or should be exempt from the reorganization effort.
Vocational Rehabilitation was one of the areas that had a separate federal
funding stream, a separate federal oversight agency, and a separate
advocate community. This advocate group made independent appeals to
the federal agencies and to the incoming governor to suspend the
reorganization.
Elections result in changes in administrative personnel, based on legal
restrictions (one type of constraint), but independently from market
indicators (another constraint). One of the consequences of this is key

personnel turbulence. In the public arena, there is a combination of
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reasonably anticipated, and therefore planned, as well as unplanned,
administrative turnover. While turnover exists in both private and public
arenas, the public arena has the added complication of a change in the
administration resulting simply from regularly scheduled elections.
Furthermore, as noted previously, turnover of executives in the private
setting can be tied to an organization’s performance, whereas state
governments are composed of several agencies or departments; some may
perform well, and others may not. The poor performance of any one agency
is unlikely to result in a change in the governor (the state executive). Similarly,
the agency heads appointed by a new governor are subject not only to the kind
of turnover that exists in the private sector, but also to regular changes
resulting from public elections, regardless of performance.
Distinct from what is seen in the private sector, a new governor’s
replacement of agency personnel is not necessarily a reflection of the
performance of either the agency head or staff. It does not necessarily mean
that there is a desire for a change in emphasis or direction. In short, an
election can be a constraint to implementing planned organizational
change, simply because there will be resulting turnover of personnel who
were involved with the initiation of the change process from the start, or have
been actively executing the change plan. This personnel turbulence, while
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not necessarily positive or negative, means that the agency and new
administration will go through a reorientation process and reassessment on
a regular basis, and the impact of this transition process has not been
taken into account in the previous literature.
Turning to the question of whether the OD process can help generate
solutions, the preliminary answer seems to be yes. In the interviews,
respondents indicated a variety of ways to address the obstacles to the
issues they identified. They were:
1. Recognize that the rate of change is a matter of perception and
depends on one’s job.
2. Develop a matrix of all the programs in the organization and delineate
cost-cutting features.
3. Develop a transition culture and a final values-based culture.
4. Show that promotions and rewards are tied to the goals of the
reorganization.
5. Make the driving vision come from the field offices.
While each interviewee had some time to consider their response, they
were spontaneous. This, combined with explicitly asking about solutions
to identified issues, is an effective w ay to develop positive suggestions,

and is more constructive than simply providing an opportunity to point out
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problems or complain. In order to develop a response, the interviewees
demonstrated that they understood the connection between the
reorganization’s objectives, the implementation, and barriers, and made
candid suggestions that they would support. This short list does not
address all the issues that were raised, nor does it include a feasibility
assessment.

Third Study Objective
A third objective was to determine whether the major policy areas,
regulatory versus redistributive, varied in their receptiveness to the goals of
the reorganization. It was anticipated that there would be differences
within the agency regarding the concept of client service integration.
For example, it was expected that the views of those who worked in
quasi-legal regulatory areas, like health facility licensing, would be similar
to the views of those in, for example, vital records, but would differ from
the views of those responsible for redistributive policies (as in traditional
‘welfare’ services).
It was further speculated that there would be differences between the
views of those in redistributive policy areas and the views of those whose
primary work related to, for example, the provision of health care services,
or vocational rehabilitation, given their different orientations.
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Comparable high-levels of support for and understanding of the goal of
the reorganization (improved client services) were found throughout the
organization, based on internal surveys and reports. However, this study
also found that policy areas differed in their perceptions of the actual
relevance of the restructuring to their jobs. In some of the areas, there
was confusion about what the change was going to mean on a practical
level.
Put another way, even though the stated goals of the reorganization
were understood, they were not uniformly perceived as relevant. This
makes some sense because the focus was on client services and so
those who had jobs that were less directly related to client service
provision would be less impacted. Unexpectedly, however, the perception
of a lack of relevance was as strong in the policy specialist area of Health
Services as it was in the public administration generalist area of Finance
and Policy Analysis. The Finance and Policy Analysis area was the
administrative fulcrum of the reorganization. Thus, there was insufficient
evidence to draw conclusions about the relationship between policy
domains and the reorganization.
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C O N CLUSIO N S

This study had what turned out to be an optimistic premise. It was
assumed that a well-planned reorganization, especially one augmented by
the Organization Development process, would be fully executed. The
literature on reorganizing state public human service organizations
indicated that such efforts encounter constraints, termination, and in some
cases reversal. Despite this, the study design did not take into
consideration the possibility that the entire reorganization effort would be
interrupted. While this is cause for reflection, the outcome was consistent
with the literature. It is worth noting that the efforts went largely as
planned as the initial leaders and champions were guiding the effort. It
was only after the key players changed that the planned organizational
change changed course. This case highlights the considerable challenges
of research on organizational change in complex public human service
organizations.
Despite, or perhaps because of this, the current study was able to
capture information about the elusive nature of reorganizing public human
service organizations, particularly those aimed at greater service
integration. In fact, because key data gathering steps were completed
before the reorganization was terminated, and can now be made explicit,
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future public human service organizational change efforts may be
designed more effectively.
In addition, there are implications for designing research on planned
change in a public organization. Specifically, public organization research
needs to incorporate the important and significant role of external
organizations (including intergovernmental relations), advocacy groups,
and individuals with interests in the key processes of the organization.
Because the new governor had the same party affiliation as his
predecessor, and during his campaign expressed support for the goals of
the reorganization, there was no evidence that competing ideologicalpolitical differences or power struggles between branches of government
were the precipitating events in the decision to sustain or suspend the
reorganization, contrary to Lynn’s view. Nor was there evidence that the
nature of a policy type (regulatory versus redistributive) played a role for
with-in party succession in the Governor’s office. Simply put, the end of
one governor’s term of office, the transition, and act of succession were a
primary constraining force at work here.
There was some administrative turbulence before and after the
gubernatorial change. After the reorganization began, the deputy director
became the director after the departure of the one who initiated the
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reorganization. That is, the head of the agency changed during the time that
the governor who had been involved in the initiation of the restructuring under
study here was leaving office. The new director was motivated to show
‘results’ before the governor’s term ended. This translated into an increased
pace, as was identified as one of the major negative issues in the interviews.
The new director’s leadership style also emerged as having a major impact
on the restructuring. This all occurred during this study, and helps explain
some of the seemingly contradictory results. For example, there was broad
support for the intention behind the restructuring, but negative responses
regarding the process.
A new director was appointed after the election, resulting from the
change in governorship, and then that director was replaced by the
director who had originally been in place at the beginning of the change.
Thus, leadership style, as well as the regular, scheduled change in the
state executive branch, with the resulting change in agency administration,
emerged here as the most prominent constraining forces.
This study adds to an understanding how constraining forces work
during restructuring in this type of organization. Instead of any political
contentiousness being a factor, it was the transition between one elected
official and the next during the restructuring that produced the biggest
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impact. Nearing the end of one governor’s term accelerated the process,
and the start of his successor’s term terminated it. Thus, one was a
facilitating force, and the other a constraining force.
The first post-election agency director suspended the reorganization and
disbanded the agency cluster that was primarily responsible for coordinating
the reorganization effort. The original implementation plan was
suspended in response to feedback to the director. Feedback included
the interview summary presented here, a separate interview summary of
managers, independently solicited and produced by electronic mail from
staff, and a survey conducted by the Department of Administrative
Services (Thorne, 2004).
The act of changing regimes creates a break, or discontinuity. Breaks
occur when there are new governors and/or new directors. The incoming
public official goes through an orientation process. During the course of
determining priorities, they reassess the efforts of their predecessors
based on information sources that may not be the same as those that
informed the initial reorganization effort. These transition points of being
disorganized create a great challenge and opportunity. It may be useful to
acknowledge, from an administrators view, that nothing can be done by

one administrator to bind a future administrator’s discretion; influence or
inform, yes.
One challenge is the vulnerability of the reorganization effort to
exertion of power and influence of stakeholders who have developed
direct relationships with the agency, have redress through courts, and
opportunity to influence legislation and budgets. The opportunity is,
knowing this transition within a transition may be inevitable, to explicitly
articulate, review and recommit to the (re)organizing principles and values.
While this may not prevent abandoning an effort, it may make the
consequences or trade-offs between the choices of sustaining the gains
and termination clearer and a well-considered choice.
Other conclusions can be drawn from this study that are generally
applicable to the field of public organizational change. Consistent with, and
adding to, past research (Golembiewski, Kotter, Lynn, and Owens), results
from this study revealed the need for reconsidering planned organizational
change in public organizations. In particular, this study identifies the need
for a more specific planned organizational change model as it applies to
complex state-level public human service organizations. The results indicate
that the organization development phases may need to be modified as well,

to adapt to the cycles of change that appear to be inevitable when there is
a change in the state’s executive branch.
Both the classic and human relations schools, exemplified by altering
formal organizational structure and by applying OD, respectively, were
employed in this research. However, restructuring, as conceptualized
here, was a ‘one shot fix’. During this study, large-scale formal restructuring
was never finalized; it, like OD, needs to be iterative. Similarly, integrating
services needs to be treated as an ongoing, asymptotic process, and not as
a single outcome.
Using Kotter’s Wheel was helpful in this analysis and potentially for
future public human service organization change planning because it has
categories that explain organizational change in a variety of
circumstances. Here it was useful to describe areas that the previous
literature on change in public organizations, and public human services
organizations’ efforts toward integrated services, had not addressed. In
particular, seeing how the redesign of one of the key elements may
influence the other areas and the reverse, and how all of the elements
may influence the key process, helped to broadly categorize constraining
forces that were not apparent in previous research. It appears to be the

case that all of the elements in Kotter’s Wheel need to be considered,
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rather than expecting that changing one of the peripheral areas alone will
impact the key processes in a predictable and desired way. Kotter’s
Wheel is a conceptual overlay that can span both the classic
(restructuring) and OD processes. It was used, in part, because the first
research question was whether OD could inform restructuring. It may be
useful to consider adding to the tool by changing the elements graphically
to portray transition stages; a larger circle representing greater emphasis;
smaller circle less emphasis.

Understanding Constraints to Change
One unanticipated complication that became apparent in the interviews
was the perception that there was more than one motive for the
reorganization. The explanation for this is that the implementation coincided
with a state budgetary crisis, and so there was a suspicion that the ‘real’
motive was simply to reduce staffing levels. The interviews indicated that
the reorganization created stress and confusion (i.e., it was thought that the
reorganization had two purposes—to improve client services and also reduce
staff—even though only the former had been explicitly stated). This
uncertainty and hesitancy was, it appears, interpreted by some in
management as recalcitrance or resistance to the changes. This, in turn,
resulted in a greater directive style. An intercultural communication
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breakdown occurred between senior management and staff. The changes
had a disorienting effect and there did not appear to be a reorientation
scheme. This understanding was derived because of this author being a
participant observer in this case study.
The interviews indicated that staff believed they were doing a good job,
and then, seemingly abruptly, they felt they were being told that this was
not the case. The message they heard in some cases, that they were not
meeting client needs, created uncertainty. Furthermore, this disorientation
resulted in needing more affirmation or confirmation from superiors, yet
that was not available. Relationships, regular reporting and informal, were
altered. Certain mid-level manager positions were eliminated; staff were
reassigned to administrative functions versus policy areas, without
replacement. Those who had been with the agency for some time and
had considerable policy or regulatory knowledge were no longer
accessible. These changes occurred when the information needs may
have been at their greatest, prior to the preparation for the upcoming
budgets.
There was evidence that the requirements for federal financial
participation, as opposed to funding amounts, acted as a constraint. The
agency’s original organizational structure was developed incrementally; it
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reflected variations in federal funding reporting requirements and
performance measurements, as well as federal changes in policies over
time. Interview respondents indicated that these variations proved to be
constraints to achieving the major goal of the reorganization—service
integration. Specifically, the cost allocation practices and reporting
requirements for the major policy areas were different. Perceptions
existed that Health Services, particularly in the public health functions,
were more grant-dependent (both federal and private non-profit) than
other areas of the agency.
Correspondingly, respondents identified variations in local government’s
institutional capacity to alter the delivery service system as an additional
constraint, but the study was primarily focused on the agency’s staff.
Leadership style emerged as the second-most frequently cited theme
in the interviews. The importance of different styles was brought into
sharp relief during the transitions between administrators. The way in
which they absorbed and interpreted the ongoing process set the tone for how
the entire process would then proceed. This occurred three times during the
reorganization. Each time, there was at least a pause in the change effort, as
the new director’s style and outlook was assimilated by those who, in many
cases, had been in on the change from the start. As an example of the

134

impact of leadership style, a message that was heard from one of the head
administrators was ‘like it or leave’, which squelched dissention or
disagreement. This, in turn, limited the amount of open feedback that was
provided, ultimately impeding the feedback mechanism from the ‘field.’
The finding of wide variations in perceptions of the duration of the
reorganization was another unexpected result. Some people thought that
the effort had been ‘talked about’ for a long time, while others, even some
who had been with the agency for a long time, thought that more recent
efforts were abrupt. Individuals who perceived the reorganization effort as
having been underway longer were supportive of a more directive or
authoritarian approach toward facilitating reorganization. Similarly, survey
results showed variations in expectations, within clusters and offices,
about when results of the reorganization would be seen.
The magnitude of the role that variations in information systems played
as a constraining force to the organizational change effort was also
unanticipated. The agency had several different information systems that
were created within the old organizational structure. They were in various
stages of development; some were considered obsolete and were being
replaced. Yet, during this transition, the lack of an integrated information
system was a constraint from a system and service perspective. The
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information systems were not designed to assess the effectiveness of the
reorganization and necessitated supplemental, ad hoc, monitoring and
evaluation activities. Similarly, the budget processes, which relied on those
systems, were designed and begun before the reorganization and,
consequently, reflected the old organizational structure. While in isolation
these issues were not perceived as insurmountable, the combination made
resource allocation prioritization even more complex.
Another constraint was that the process for changing leadership is
institutionalized in public agencies, rather than based on the merit of those
in leadership positions. Private, publicly-traded private, and not-for-profit
organizations do not have the obligation to subject their leadership to fixed
intervals for replacement and terms of office. Public entities are subject to
a system of checks and balances or separations of power, which are
intended to disperse power and make unilateral changes difficult, if not
impossible. In the agency under study here, a new governor and a
change in the state legislators resulted in the installation of new agency
administrators, as previously mentioned.
Public agencies are also subject to regular leadership changes
regardless of agency performance. M arket forces and customer
satisfaction do not determine success for public human service
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organizations; public organizations do not have that environmental
feedback. Legislative, executive, and agency leadership changes happen
for reasons completely unrelated to client satisfaction or the agency’s
performance, and so cannot be taken as direct indicators of the
effectiveness of the organization. On the other hand, in a private
organization, a leadership change can be prompted by a board or
stockholders precisely and exclusively because of an organization’s
performance or loss of customers, and so a change in leadership could be
construed as reflective of the organization’s success.
The entire reorganization under study here was ultimately suspended,
but not because of the constraints identified by Lynn, Owens, and
Golembiewski. In addition to the DHS director changing three times, the
Governor changed during the reorganization. As noted above, at each
transition, the new administrator, after becoming oriented to the process to
date, reevaluated it. The staff survey and interview results were part of
the reevaluation, by one of the directors, which resulted in the scope and
rate of change of the restructuring being fundamentally altered.
One contribution made by this study was the demonstration of the need to
plan a reorganization that has service integration as its primary objective

from the ‘ground up,’ and concurrently review all the elements that
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contribute to the key organizational processes, in the short and long term,
rather than focusing primarily on altering existing formal reporting
relationships (restructuring). It is necessary to first develop a clear inventory
of existing programs, policies, and procedures (or lack thereof), and
identify the key organizational processes that the field staff produce and
the elements that support the production. Support system components
that will take the longest to change, such as information systems, and that
are most important to the delivery of services, such as education and
training on the reporting relationships based on the new decision-making
hierarchy, should be prioritized early. Then the focus should turn to
identification of existing sub-cultures, and facilitating changing those by
establishing transition values and norms—values and norms that foster direct
and candid communication. Two visions—the transition process and the
desired end-state—need to be co-created by upper management and field
staff, and need to incorporate the perspectives of clients and advocacy
groups. These visions would then be communicated through diverse
mediums to all stakeholders. There would be a continuous change process in
these areas as relationships evolve, new technology emerges, and the
priorities established by funding mechanisms and executive and legislative
edicts are put forth. It should also be recognized that major reorganizations
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require staff time, time away from regular responsibilities, which translates
into funding; these efforts are not budget-neutral.
The organization, it seems, needs to have the administrator and the
elected governor in agreement at least in principle about the need for change.
The administrator and change facilitators (if they are not the same) must have
the authority to make the changes. Some of the elements of Kotter’s Wheel
will need to change at different rates. While some will be incremental, others
must be fast, dramatic, and be as near to intractable as possible. Formal
reporting relationships is an example of an element that may be best served
through quick change. There is a need for the new leaders to check in with
the organizations at the transition points. Ideally, the systematization phase
would be completed in the period of one elected official’s term of office. If this
is not possible, or there is reason to suspect the desire to change is not
powerful enough to sustain itself within the organization, one solution may be
to transfer the authority to an outside entity during the transition in order to
sustain the effort.
Under the director who was in place during the initial phases, the pace
was methodical and considered. What occurred during this study, and this
author was able to observe, was that a new director appeared to

unilaterally accelerate the pace of change, in part to demonstrate results
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prior to the upcoming budget and election cycles. Staff and other
stakeholders were part of developing the beginning steps, but then their
role changed to simply being apprised of decisions during ‘stakeholder
meetings.’ It was not a dialectic process. Their opportunity to influence
the outcomes was suddenly limited. Having both, a sitting governor and
governor-elect, for a period created an opportunity to circumvent the
change process. Reorganization planners should be cognizant that these
overlaps occur at the legislative level as well.
Consider, in addition, the unfreezing, change, and then refreezing
metaphor to describe an organizational change process. The need to
show the legislature results from the refrozen state meant that the
reorganization had to be ‘set’ in time to make assessments, or at least the
perception that the change process was finalized had to be conveyed.
This also meant that there would be a perception of fewer opportunities for
influencing the final state. However, just as this final state came into
focus, i.e., when there was a directly proportionate increased need for
stakeholder influence, they were not included in the active process.
Of additional importance, it appears that a ‘final’ frozen state may
never really exist. Given how long discussion had been occurring, will
likely continue to occur, and resulting changes be implemented, the
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organization continues to evolve. Here, as in other state governments,
there will be budget changes, technological innovations, and changes in
the dominant coalition (all of which are elements that Kotter outlined),
changes in the operating environment and the values of the public. This
will alter how the key processes are accomplished.
In this study example, much of this ‘ground up’ work was undertaken at
the outset. However, the pace of implementation changed, at first
speeding up, and then stopping at the upper echelons of the state and the
organization. The effort was not rolled back. Progress was made, and
perhaps more could have been made with additional consistent
leadership. The key lesson here, using Kotter’s wheel to help understand
the dynamic, is that a short-term impact (resulting from a dominant
coalition change) can result in cessation of changes being made to the
key processes. In this instance, resistance increased from external
stakeholders when the organization’s leadership changed during the
reorganization, and then again with a change of governors. Therefore,
Kotter’s wheel can provide insight and a way of framing the issue related
to the change effort. It should be noted that Kotter’s wheel could be
enhanced by showing interaction between the elements (based on this
study the task environment and dominant coalition, for example) instead of
between the elements and the key process alone.
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Another lesson uses the recursive double-loop learning that Chris
Argyris suggests requires contrasting espoused values with those values
actually in practice. An additional OD view is that the whole process
requires collaboration. In the case here, the collaboration seems to have
broken down in a number of areas. One example was the staff perception
that they lacked a support system giving the ‘street-level bureaucrat’ the
tools, decision-making authority, knowledge, and skills necessary to
implement the objectives of the reorganization.
There may be some concern on the part of managers that allowing field
staff this level of influence could result in chaos and self-serving behavior,
but the data presented here indicated that very few people were more
concerned with their own well-being than that of their clients or the
organization. Even when employees expressed fear about the security of
their jobs, there was no evidence of prioritizing the protection of one’s ‘turf’
over the needs of clients. There were no expressions of dissension that were
couched in labor versus management terms. This ‘ground-up’ approach
requires an open, two-way communication channel, so that the support
system is more closely directed by those who are providing direct client
services, thus enabling real-time change. It also means checking in
periodically to see if there is any discontinuity between the espoused
values and values in practice.
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Formal restructuring is one step in changing key organizational processes,
and OD is another. A synthesis of the two allows a better understanding of
the organization’s existing social system, and facilitates the creation of a
replacement culture and organization. The measure of success for
reorganization ought not be the acceptability of the concept of integration,
but rather the frequency with which those in the field identify issues related
to service integration and the effectiveness of the support system in
realigning itself to address those issues. The support system and
organizational structure cannot be perceived to be fixed; there is not a true
and perfect end state. The organization must be flexible enough to
assimilate and adapt to problems as they arise.
That restructuring and OD can be used to reveal the internal social
system, or culture of an organization, was made apparent, for example, by
the variations in perceived relevance of the mission, goals, and objectives
on a practical level. This disconnect persists into the commitment to the
restructuring and service integration. The next step in the OD process
would be to initiate a discussion about these differences and their
meaning, and determine what step, if any, ought to be taken to reconcile
the variation. As an illustration, service areas that saw themselves as
being largely unaffected by the reorganization may not be essential to the key
organizational processes, and therefore their services might be more
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appropriately delivered through another apparatus. This is not to say the
programs, policies, and services of those areas are unimportant; to the
contrary, they may be extremely critical. However, they may simply be
part of a different functional area, with different unarticulated missions,
goals and objectives, and should be overtly treated as such.
This study demonstrated that public organizational change models
need to explicitly anticipate and plan for the characteristics that are unique
to public organizations. A successful reorganization model ought to
incorporate a rapid-cycle improvement process, and employ methods for
assessing and altering the restructuring at short intervals, rather than
waiting until the ‘end’ to evaluate the effectiveness. This would build
‘double-loop’ learning (Argyris, 1993) into the restructuring plan.
Another suggestion based on this study is that reorganization plans
should not be reliant on the formal organizational structure, while it is itself
undergoing change, as the primary vehicle to communicate and sustain
that change while it is in flux.
In the case of a state human service organization, dissimilar policy and
program objectives during the planning stages of the organizational
change effort should be addressed. From this author’s perspective, the
organization’s subcultures need to be described, and the plan should set aside

144

time to create a transition culture. It would need to effectively
communicate which changes are the result of the reorganization effort and
which are part of changes induced by the operating environment. The
current values, mission, goals, and objectives of the organization need to
be reviewed as part of the change, in order to allow people in disparate
parts of the organization to discuss relevant needs. Finally, it should
anticipate changes in the organization’s dominant coalition (Kotter).
That is to say, there should be a plan for change within the change
plan. New administrators’ reassessment of their predecessor’s actions
and direction is inevitable, and needs to be taken into account. Public
agency reorganizations should be planned around regular changes in
leadership. This could be achieved by designing the changes in
sequential, incremental steps, each of which could be completely
accomplished within one election cycle. Historically, scheduled changes
in leadership have frequently, if not universally, resulted in interruptions of
planned reorganizations of public entities. Despite the obvious importance
of these changes in leadership, this has not been previously addressed in
the literature. Staging the reorganization steps according to transitions
between administrations, and redefining “success” as the achievement of

each step, would prevent the entire reorganization being described as a
failure, because it was not implemented within one term.
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In addition, the utilization, in repeated iterations, of the OD method
outlined above in the literature review and employed here (the interview,
summary, and feedback stages) as well as the unfreezing and freezing
steps (Lewin) would be more effectively employed in this setting if done as
discrete components, designed between election cycles.
Organizational stress during change should be anticipated, and the
means for addressing it outlined in the plan. Rethinking resistance as
information can transform it from something to be overcome into a useful
tool. Periodically obtaining stakeholder (e.g., self-described client advocate
groups) input, as a mere gesture, during the initial stages of the restructuring,
when all of the relevant decisions have already been made, as was done
here, is counterproductive. Eliciting their input earlier, when they can actually
influence the implementation, is much more appropriate.
Perceptions about the pace of change emerged as an especially
important factor in this study (see question #2 in the interviews). The
perceived pace, or rate, that results were expected from the
reorganization was relational. Those closer to the center or upper
management (at the administrative level) saw the pace as slower than those
on the periphery (at the ‘street level’) did. The upper echelons of the
administration had been having discussions, planning, reviewing, and refining
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the plan for many years. As one moved lower in the hierarchy, the
pervasiveness and frequency of these formative interactions declined.
Similarly, what was considered minor or too detailed at the center (upper
administration) to be important, was significant and major at the periphery—in
many cases such items were an employee’s focus on a daily basis,
constituting their livelihood. An analogy, consider the rotational velocity and
force the rim of a wheel as opposed to the hub.
Those who are responsible for implementing organizational change
should bear in mind that not everyone would have the same perceptions
of how long an effort has been underway. Those at the ‘bottom’ of an
organizational chart, where the focus of this type of organizational change
is to be most prominent (because they are the ones actually implementing
the changes, while simultaneously trying to continue their usual duties) will
not have been exposed to the developmental discourse for the same
period of time that those at the ‘top’ have been. In addition, if the lack of
integration is known and indeed a fundamental premise of the change is
that the organization is not integrated, then expecting uniform
implementation is not realistic. To put this more directly, the skills needed
to facilitate lasting change may not be the same as those needed to
administer an organization.
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Communication needs within any organization will vary. Not
acknowledging the difference in perceptions of the relationship of the
reorganization’s focus to that of a functional area, like Health Services,
may in fact produce greater resistance. That is, while the idea of
integration may be well understood, the specific changes may not, and
how those are conveyed must be through pre-existing communication
channels. Increasing the sense of urgency about when changes are
expected to be incorporated, in reaction to perceived recalcitrance, may
simply produce greater resistance.
In this study, at least some of the factors that ultimately contributed to
the suspension can be traced to a dialectic breakdown. There was
movement away from a ‘collegial’ leadership style (under one director) that
relied on discussion and agreement, to a formal leadership style (under a
successive director) that emphasized authority, rules, and regulation
(Bennis & Nanus, 1985, p.110-138). Engaging client and other
stakeholder (including field staff) input appears to be needed constantly
and in real-time, and more so as the final stages of change are nearing.
Any breakdown in the dialectic process can mean the stakeholders will
use the option of circumventing the agency director, particularly if the
perception exists that their interests are not being reflected in the new
organization. The indication that the increased pace was seen as too
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rapid may have been a warning sign that participants were not being
heard. In other words, broadly casting confusion or questions as
resistance shuts down communication, and it is at this point that greater,
more intense communication is needed. Too often, it seemed,
expressions of concern were perceived as resistance. This created a bit
of a communication ‘death spiral.’ The process of including stakeholders’
perceptions cannot be a one time ‘buy-in’, nor their participation relegated
to ‘updates.’ It may be more useful to perceive their support and
participation as being on ‘loan,’ rather than as a ‘buy-in’, and as something
that can be withdrawn. Prior to the regime transitions, these ‘loans’ need
to be renegotiated.
Previous research indicated that reorganizations in public human service
areas were initiated and ended for ‘political and economic’ reasons. In
assessing the reason for change in a public agency, and its success, it is
difficult to separate political and economic reasons for initiating or ending a
change from those that occur whenever there is new leadership. The art in
public administration is finding a balance between meeting the expectations of
the public and elected officials to show positive results of their administrations,
and moving a bureaucracy beyond undetectable incrementalism or

retrenchment (Bennis & Nanus, 1985).
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In summary, there was a change in the Governor and agency
leadership, and the reorganization effort was subsequently altered.
However, this was not a direct cause and effect link. The change in
administrators that occurred before the election produced the level of
discord, detected in the interviews that triggered the review by the
incoming governor and new agency administrator. Gubernatorial and
subsequent administrative changes are predictable events. Planned
organizational change in a public agency needs to construct its
implementation with that inevitability in mind. Planned organizational
change in public human service organizations need to be stage to
coincide with the reassessment and reorientation that inevitably occur
because they are public agencies.
In addition, restructuring of public human services organizations has
historically tended to be a reaction to (and initiated as a solution for)
increased demands and decreased resources resulting from economic
downturns. Clearly, such tumultuous times are not optimal for attempting
to globally change an agency. If possible, they should be initiated when
caseloads are not at their highest and resources at their lowest.
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Limitations and Implications for Further Research
The complexity of organizational change reinforces one finding
resulting from this study—that it is important to have more than one research
method when doing exploratory research on organizational change. While
some of the limitations of this study were anticipated, which is why more
than one method was used, some were not. Had this study not been
approached using different methods, it may not have been possible to
capture the coincidence of the change in governor, change in
administrator, and change in pace (reflected in the interviews and
explained by archival data) as they occurred.
This case study was conducted in a single state, setting, and time
period. Therefore, the findings here may not be transferable to other
types of state agencies, levels of government, or other states. The
circumstances that created the opportunity for this study may not be
replicable in other venues. In particular, the concepts of leadership style
and pace, and consequently their impacts, were relative. That is, the
same behaviors and expectations may not produce the same results in
other organizations, even other state public human service organizations,
without the contrast effect.
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While tacit, Oregon’s political culture, which is embodied in its state
government, may also have had impacts. For example, the state’s
reputation for comparatively high levels of integrity and innovation
(Devine, 1972), may have enabled recruitment and retention of effective
administrative leaders. Changing economic conditions and budget
demands may have had profound, but isolated effects. Similarly, the
context for the changes in the beginning and toward the end may have
changed over time. The influence of the media, changes in federal policy
and funding, and the impact of the state’s political and economic
environment were not assessed. The organization moved from a rational
methodical approach to change into a ‘crisis mode’, attributable in part to
the budget shortfall.
Similarly, the greatest limitation of this study was that despite every
effort to explicitly lay out the research design so that it could be
reproduced, it is unlikely that events could occur in such a way as to allow
its replication. It is unfortunate that more could not have been done here
to chronicle the decision-making processes and sources of information
that went into developing the reorganization plan, as well as map how it
changed over time. The reorganization inevitably meant that roles,
responsibilities, and personnel would change. With those changes, the
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kind of documentation that would have been helpful was not traceable and
the ability to inform the theoretical premises may have been lost as well.
The research design here needed to anticipate the potential that
schedules would shift, and take into account what turned out to be the
most important impact-that the effort may be terminated or reversed.
There were limitations that were the result of the methods that were
employed. The interviews were not a representative random sample, so
they did not necessarily represent the entire agency. Because there were
a limited number of interviews and a non-random interviewee selection
process was used, the interview results were not intended to be and
cannot be considered a representative sample of the agency. The
archival data sources were voluminous and an adequate representation of
the scope and depth was not feasible in one study.
Another challenge is simply how one characterizes the organization at
the various stages of change. For example, is there really such a ‘thing’
as a Health Services or Children, Adults, and Families ‘cluster’? Is it an
operational or testable concept? Since they were newly formed, were the
differences attributable to that cluster? If not, then what phenomena do
the variations in responses reflect? The concept of external constraint
was not adequately developed. Anecdotal evidence indicated that there
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was influence by the type of funding and associated requirements (for
example different accounting periods) on the magnitude of change that
was possible.
The research design did not allow for exploration of the influence of
‘stakeholders’, or for operationalization of the concepts of political
development or generalist manager versus policy area specialist. The
relationship between the concepts of political development (appeasing
interest groups by creating formal official, and in some cases, contractual
relationships because of perceived electoral influence and entrenchment
of the client-beneficiary group) and organizational change needs more
sophisticated measures and identification of variables with greater
construct validity. The amount of control that interest groups exerted
during this change needs further exploration. While Lynn suggested that
the change process is initiated for ‘political’ reasons, it appears here that a
change process can be suspended or at least halted by political means.
In the end, the early termination of the reorganization, while this study
was underway, allowed unique observations and analysis of the persistent
constraints to successfully reorganizing public human services
organizations and help in planning future .

You see, all establishments, administrative or judiciary, must lead so to
speak dual existence—that is, on the one hand, it is indispensable that
they exist (I agree that they should) and, on the other, that they do not
exist—depending on what the central authorities have in mind. If it turns
out that these establishments are needed, they will be right here at hand.
If the need for them passes, no one will find them in my province.
The Possessed
Fyodor Dostoyevsky, 1872
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